United States v. Carl Stuber
20-1982
| 8th Cir. | Jun 11, 2021Background
- Between 2018–2019 Stuber made repeated threatening calls to bank employees and family members after disputes over access to a trust; he was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)–(d).
- On Nov. 12, 2019 Stuber pleaded guilty to two counts pursuant to a written plea agreement that included a broad "Waiver of Appeal" with limited exceptions (e.g., sentence not in accordance with agreement; sentence exceeds statutory maximum; constitutionally defective sentence).
- At change-of-plea the district court questioned Stuber about competency and voluntariness; counsel affirmed competency and voluntariness; Stuber acknowledged understanding the waiver.
- At sentencing the court calculated a Guidelines range of 37–46 months, granted the government an upward departure under USSG § 2A6.1, denied other adjustments, and imposed 72 months (and stated it would have imposed an equivalent upward variance if the departure were erroneous).
- Stuber appealed, arguing due process/ procedural error (claiming the court failed properly to consider his mental condition and relied on erroneous facts). The government moved to enforce the appeal waiver.
- The Eighth Circuit reviewed waiver enforceability and dismissed the appeal, holding the waiver covers Stuber’s claims, the plea and waiver were knowing and voluntary, and enforcement would not produce a miscarriage of justice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the plea agreement's appeal waiver is ambiguous (paragraph 12(I) vs. waiver clause) | Paragraph 12(I) reserving litigation of guideline adjustments creates ambiguity and preserves appellate rights | No conflict: paragraph 12(I) governs sentencing-stage litigation; waiver limits appellate rights | Waiver is not ambiguous; enforceable as written |
| Whether Stuber’s due process claim is a constitutionally protected challenge outside the waiver | Stuber says district court violated due process by not finding a mental disorder and by relying on erroneous facts | Government: claim is really a substantive unreasonableness/ sentencing-discretion argument covered by the waiver | Claim is substantive in nature, not a constitutional defect; falls within waiver |
| Whether plea and waiver were entered knowingly and voluntarily | (Implicit) Stuber contests sentencing consequences and effectiveness of consideration | Record of plea colloquy and counsel’s statements show understanding and voluntariness | Plea and waiver were knowing and voluntary; enforceable |
| Whether enforcing the waiver would cause a miscarriage of justice | Enforcement would deny review of alleged sentencing unfairness | Miscarriage-of-justice exception is narrow and not satisfied here | No miscarriage of justice; waiver enforced and appeal dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Dallman, 886 F.3d 1277 (8th Cir. 2018) (standard for reviewing interpretation and enforcement of plea agreements and appeal waivers)
- United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining when waiver enforcement yields a miscarriage of justice)
- United States v. Sisco, 576 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2009) (colloquy evidence supports finding plea and waiver were knowing and voluntary)
- United States v. Gatling, 803 F. App'x 969 (8th Cir. 2020) (illustrating narrow scope of miscarriage-of-justice exception)
