United States v. Caraballo
831 F.3d 95
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- Police found Melissa Barratt’s body (shot in the back of the head) in a secluded area; circumstances suggested a homicide and that the assailant could still be armed.
- Barratt had earlier told police she feared Frank Caraballo and that he would kill her if she cooperated; she had worked in Caraballo’s drug operation.
- Investigators had recently conducted multiple controlled buys from Caraballo and knew phone numbers he used in the drug trade; he had no fixed Vermont residence.
- Believing confidential informants and undercover officers might be in imminent danger, officers asked Sprint to locate ("ping") Caraballo’s cell phone via GPS without a warrant under Sprint’s emergency process.
- Sprint pinged the phone repeatedly over ~2 hours; the pings located Caraballo’s vehicle, local officers visually identified and stopped him, and he was arrested and made inculpatory statements.
- District Court denied suppression (finding either no Fourth Amendment search, or exigent circumstances, and alternatively good-faith reliance); the Second Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether warrantless GPS "pinging" of Caraballo’s phone was a Fourth Amendment search | Caraballo: pinging was a warrantless search that violated the Fourth Amendment and requires suppression of evidence | Government: either no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone location, or exigent circumstances made the pinging reasonable; officers acted in good faith | Court: assumed arguendo search question unnecessary to resolve because exigent circumstances justified the warrantless pinging; affirmed denial of suppression |
| Whether exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless location pinging | Caraballo: no true exigency—officers could have used other methods or obtained a warrant; intent was evidence collection, not immediate threat abatement | Government: murder was brutal; victim warned police about Caraballo’s propensity for violence; undercover agents/informants faced imminent risk; delay to obtain/wait on provider could be deadly | Court: exigent circumstances existed—officers reasonably believed Caraballo posed imminent threat to informants/undercover officers and delay obtaining location could result in death; limited intrusion justified |
| Whether exclusionary rule applies because of statutory or good-faith reliance | Caraballo: suppression appropriate if Fourth Amendment violated | Government: officers reasonably relied on 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4) and prevailing practice | Court: did not decide because exigency justified the pinging; noted good-faith reliance as an alternative rationale but unnecessary to resolve |
| Whether concern over destruction/dissipation of evidence alone justified exigency | Caraballo: evidence-dissipation rationale insufficient here | Government: delay in getting provider data could lose gunshot residue/DNA or allow escape | Court: expressed doubt that destruction-of-evidence alone would suffice in these facts but relied on the imminent threat to persons as the adequate exigency basis |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2012) (exigent-circumstances standard and review of suppression rulings)
- Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) (exigency permits warrantless searches when objectively reasonable)
- Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (limitations on warrantless searches absent exigent circumstances)
- United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2008) (exigency inquiry focus on reasonable, experienced officer's perspective)
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (privacy concerns relating to cell phones and limits on warrantless searches)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (GPS tracking and Fourth Amendment privacy implications)
- Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (factors considered in exigent-circumstances analysis)
- United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (adoption of Dorman factors; totality-of-circumstances exigency test)
- Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (subjective intent irrelevant; exigency objective test)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (good-faith reliance on statute can counsel against exclusion)
- Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (clear-error standard for reviewing factual findings)