United States v. Capler
636 F.3d 321
| 7th Cir. | 2011Background
- Capler pled guilty to two drug offenses and received a 141-month sentence as a career offender based in part on an Illinois unlawful-restraint conviction.
- Illinois unlawful restraint statute, 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-3(a), prohibits unlawfully detaining another without legal authority, with no element requiring force.
- The district court classified unlawful restraint as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)/(a)(2), relying on existing Seventh Circuit precedents Wallace and Billups.
- Capler challenged whether unlawful restraint falls within the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) after Begay v. United States clarified the test for similar-in-kind and risk.
- The Seventh Circuit in Wallace held unlawful restraint generally poses a risk of violence, and Billups held Wisconsin false imprisonment is categorically violent; Capler sought to overturn these precedents.
- The court conducted a plenary review and ultimately affirmed the district court, finding Wallace controlling and not overruled by Begay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Illinois unlawful restraint qualify as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2)? | Capler argues the statute is too broad and not similar in kind to enumerated crimes. | Capler contends Wallace/Billups should be reconsidered post-Begay; seeks reversal. | Yes; unlawful restraint is a crime of violence under the residual clause. |
| Are Wallace and Billups still valid after Begay and related decisions? | Capler seeks to overrule or limit Wallace and Billups. | Wallace remains sound and Billups is consistent with Begay. | Wallace remains controlling; Billups remains persuasive post-Begay. |
| Should the Begay empirical-risk framework alter the analysis of unlawful restraint? | Capler argues Chambers/Begay undermine the risk assessment in Billups. | No need to overridable; risk analysis can rely on common-sense/experience absent statistics. | Chambers does not require empirical data to sustain the risk analysis; Begay framework remains applicable. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Wallace, 326 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2003) (unlawful restraint generally carries risk of violence; supports crime-of-violence labeling)
- United States v. Billups, 536 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2008) (analogous Wisconsin false imprisonment is categorically violent; analyzes 'without consent' and risk of confrontation)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (U.S. 2008) (added similar-in-kind inquiry and required risk assessment to determine violent felonies under residual clause)
- United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2009) (divisible statutes and expanded inquiry when appropriate; helps define residual-clause analysis post-Begay)
- Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (U.S. 2009) (emphasizes empirical data in risk assessment for crimes of violence (contextual to Begay framework))