811 F.3d 133
4th Cir.2015Background
- Camden Barlow pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and imposed a 15-year (180-month) mandatory term.
- Barlow had four relevant prior North Carolina convictions: two counts of felony speeding to elude arrest (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-141.5(b)) and two counts of felony breaking and entering (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54(a)); the breaking-and-entering convictions were treated as one criminal episode by the district court.
- District court also noted a juvenile adjudication for discharging a weapon into occupied property could serve as an ACCA predicate.
- After sentencing, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, invalidating the ACCA residual clause; the government conceded Barlow’s two speeding-to-elude convictions no longer qualify as ACCA predicates.
- Barlow separately argued none of his state convictions qualified as "felonies" under § 922(g)(1) because, under North Carolina law (post-Justice Reinvestment Act), post-release supervision effectively reduces actual imprisonment below one year; he contended post-release supervision is not part of the term of imprisonment.
- The Fourth Circuit held (1) the ACCA enhancement must be vacated in light of Johnson with respect to the speeding convictions and remanded for resentencing, but (2) North Carolina’s post-release supervision is part of the statutory maximum term of imprisonment, so Barlow’s prior convictions qualify as felonies under § 922(g)(1).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Barlow’s two felony speeding-to-elude convictions count as ACCA "violent felonies" under the residual clause | Speeding-to-elude qualifies as a violent felony because it presents a serious potential risk of physical injury | Government initially argued they qualified; later conceded they do not post-Johnson | Post-Johnson, the ACCA residual clause is void for vagueness; the two speeding convictions no longer qualify as ACCA predicates and the ACCA sentence must be vacated and remanded for resentencing |
| Whether Barlow’s prior North Carolina convictions are "felony" predicates under § 922(g)(1) given North Carolina’s post-release supervision scheme | Post-release supervision is supervision, not part of the term of imprisonment; therefore some convictions exposed defendant to ≤1 year and are not federal predicate felonies | North Carolina law explicitly treats post-release supervision as part of the maximum term of imprisonment; after Justice Reinvestment Act all felonies carry a maximum >1 year | North Carolina’s statutory scheme includes post-release supervision within the term of imprisonment; under Simmons analysis each of Barlow’s convictions exposed him to >1 year and thus qualify as prior felony convictions under § 922(g)(1) |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (interpreting state sentencing schemes to determine whether prior convictions exposed defendants to >1 year imprisonment for federal predicate purposes)
- United States v. Kerr, 737 F.3d 33 (4th Cir. 2013) (clarifying Simmons inquiry focuses on the legally available term, not actual time served)
- United States v. Parral-Dominguez, 794 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding North Carolina discharge-of-firearm offense is not a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines)
- Granderson v. United States, 511 U.S. 39 (1994) (explaining federal supervised release is separate from and in addition to imprisonment)