United States v. Calvin Morgan, 572 F. App'x 292

Morgan pleaded guilty in 2009 to four counts including marijuana possession with intent to distribute, firearm discharge during a drug-trafficking crime, unlawful firearm possession by a user, and a forfeiture count.
He received 174 months total after sentencing; appeal challenged § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) ten-year minimum and the upward variance, as well as statute interpretation and indictment sufficiency.
On remand, the district court excluded the attempted-murder cross-reference for the prohibited-possession count and held Morgan intended to kill the officers during the § 924(c) offense.
The court then imposed 18 months concurrent for the drugs/possession counts and 156 consecutive months for the § 924(c) count (total 174 months), based on Morgan’s intended-to-kill finding and need for deterrence.
Morgan argued the upward variance and the court’s factual findings were improper; the Government defended the sentence as warranted by the record and § 3553(a) factors.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence, addressing procedural and substantive reasonableness, statutory interpretation of § 924(c)(1)(A), and indictment sufficiency.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Reasonableness of the upward variance	Morgan contends the variance was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.	The government argues the court adequately explained the need for deterrence, respect for law, and public protection given egregious conduct.	Affirmed; variance within permissible range and adequately justified.
Interpretation of § 924(c)(1)(A) (floor vs. ceiling)	Morgan argues the maximum under § 924(c)(1)(A) is the fixed minimum (5, 7, or 10 years) and cannot exceed that.	The court held § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) establishes a floor of 10 years with potential for longer sentences (life maximum).	Statutory maximum is life; 10-year minimum is the floor, not the ceiling.
Sufficiency of the indictment	Morgan argues the indictment, by charging a generic § 924(c)(1) count, failed to specify § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).	Indictment tracked the statute and provided notice of the discharge of a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime.	Indictment sufficient; plea and related proceedings supported conviction.
Reassignment on remand	Morgan requested reassignment to a different judge on remand.	Not necessary to decide given affirmance of sentence.	Issue not reached; reassignment notion deemed unnecessary on affirmance.

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (U.S. 2007) (procedural/substantive reasonableness standard for sentences; advisory factors apply)
Battaglia v. United States, 624 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2010) (procedural review of factual findings; abuse-of-discretion standard)
Lapsins v. United States, 570 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2009) (procedural review; complexity of sentencing determinations)
Blackie v. United States, 548 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 2008) (importance of written statements of reasons for variance; clerical error not fatal when reasons are clear)
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (S. Ct. 2013) (mandatory-minimums may be heightened by facts; dicta binding on lower courts)
Dorsey v. United States, 677 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2012) (statutory interpretation of 924(c) as floor; life maximum emphasized in circuit alignment)
Johnson v. United States, 507 F.3d 793 (2d Cir. 2007) (multiple circuits recognizing life as maximum for 924(c) scenarios)
Gamboa v. United States, 439 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 2006) (statutory interpretation of 924(c) maximums)