United States v. Cabral, 926 F.3d 687

Jon Julian Cabral pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition and was sentenced to 46 months' imprisonment plus three years supervised release.
The district court imposed the probationary Standard Condition Twelve (U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(12)), allowing a probation officer to require the defendant to notify third parties if the officer determines the defendant "poses a risk" to them and to confirm that notice.
At sentencing the court declined to define or cabin "risk," explaining it could not anticipate future risks and therefore left assessment authority to the probation officer.
Cabral challenged the condition as unconstitutionally vague and as an improper delegation of judicial power to the probation officer; the district court rejected both and imposed the condition.
On appeal the Tenth Circuit held the vagueness challenge unripe under prudential ripeness (because application is contingent on a probation officer’s future decision and factual development is needed) but found the improper-delegation claim ripe and reviewable.
The court concluded the district court’s grant of broad, undefined authority to the probation officer to define and enforce "risk" implicated multiple significant liberty interests (familial association, employment, residence) and therefore constituted an improper delegation; the sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Vagueness of risk-notification condition	Condition is unconstitutionally vague; ordinary people and probation officers cannot know what conduct triggers notification	Condition is adequate; "risk" has ordinary meaning and the condition is enforceable as written	Dismissed as prudentially unripe — requires factual development and may never be applied
Improper delegation of judicial power	Condition delegates to probation officer the power to define "risk" and thus the nature/extent of punishment without meaningful guidance	Delegation is proper because supervision decisions belong to probation and the officer is better positioned to assess future risks	Ripe and sustained — as imposed it improperly delegates judicial power; vacated sentence and remanded

United States v. Ford, 882 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2018) (conditions contingent on a third party are prudentially unripe)
United States v. Bennett, 823 F.3d 1316 (10th Cir. 2016) (ripeness factors: fitness for review and hardship)
United States v. Bear, 769 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing permissible ministerial delegations from impermissible delegations that affect significant liberty interests)
United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011) (occupational restrictions implicate liberty interests and require specific findings)
New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495 (10th Cir. 1995) (courts should avoid advisory opinions; pre-enforcement challenges ordinarily require concrete application)
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (Guidelines not subject to vagueness challenge because they guide judicial discretion)