United States v. Butler
275 F. Supp. 3d 7
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- In 1970 Jesse Mears was found murdered; Dennis Butler was arrested, tried in 1971, and convicted of first-degree murder, felony murder, and robbery; sentenced to concurrent terms including 20 years to life.
- The prosecution relied on (1) two acquaintances (Hill and Robinson) who testified Butler confessed; (2) multiple witnesses placing Butler near the scene that day; (3) paint analysis linking paint on Butler’s clothes to paint at the scene; and (4) FBI microscopic hair-comparison testimony reporting hairs on the victim’s clothing were "microscopically the same or alike" Butler’s hair.
- The FBI hair expert testified with important caveats (could not positively exclude others, gave no population frequency), but his testimony was invoked by the prosecutor to bolster the confession witnesses.
- Years later DOJ/FBI reviews found that FBI microscopic hair-comparison testimony in many cases was false or overstated; the government conceded Butler’s trial included false/misleading hair testimony and that the government knew or should have known of its falsity.
- Butler filed a § 2255 motion seeking vacation of his conviction/new trial based on Napue/Giglio/Brady principles that the government’s knowing use of false evidence denied due process.
- The district court concluded that although the hair testimony was false and should not have been used, the false evidence was not material in context — there was no reasonable likelihood the false hair testimony affected the jury’s verdict — and denied relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether government’s use of false/misleading FBI hair testimony violated due process and warrants §2255 relief | Butler: FBI hair testimony was false, knowingly used by prosecution, and materially bolstered Hill and Robinson’s confession testimony; without it, the case was equivocal | Government: Concedes hair testimony was false but argues remaining evidence (confessions, witnesses placing Butler nearby, paint evidence, keys found near Butler’s residence) overwhelmingly corroborated guilt so the false testimony was not material | Court: Hair testimony was false and government knew or should have known; but viewed in context of entire record there is no reasonable likelihood the false testimony affected the verdict — §2255 motion denied |
| Standard for materiality of false testimony in Napue/Giglio context | Butler: False evidence could have had a reasonable possibility/likelihood of affecting jury given expert "aura of science" | Government: Materiality requires showing any reasonable likelihood of affecting the jury; burden on movant to prove prejudice by preponderance | Court: Applies Napue/Giglio/Strickler standard — plaintiff must show any reasonable likelihood that false testimony could have affected jury; Butler failed to meet burden |
| Role/weight of expert forensic testimony | Butler: Expert testimony carries special weight and may unduly bias jurors; hair testimony therefore particularly prejudicial | Government: Expert’s testimony was limited, contained caveats, and prosecutor did not rely on it as the sole basis for conviction | Held: Expert testimony here was modest in the record; expert repeatedly qualified conclusions; hair evidence was one of multiple corroborating items and not outcome-determinative |
| Whether prior appellate decision (Butler v. United States) undermines or supports current relief | Butler: Argues prior decision relied on hair evidence to find harmlessness and should be reconsidered | Government: Points to the D.C. Circuit’s finding of overwhelming extrinsic corroboration of confession witnesses, independent of hair evidence | Held: Court follows and endorses appellate view that Hill/Robinson testimony had overwhelming extrinsic corroboration; prior appellate treatment does not compel relief for Butler |
Key Cases Cited
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecution’s knowledge of false testimony can violate due process)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment evidence and promises to witnesses must be disclosed; knowing use of false testimony requires new trial if it could have affected jury)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of favorable material evidence violates due process when material)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (outlines elements of Brady claim and materiality standard)
- Agurs v. United States, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (discusses perjured-testimony subset of Brady and materiality framing)
- Butler v. United States, 481 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (appellate decision describing trial record as supported by overwhelming extrinsic corroboration of confession witnesses)
- Vega v. United States, 826 F.3d 514 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (application of Napue/Giglio materiality test; review of false testimony in context of entire record)