United States v. Bush, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24711

Bush ran a four-year, $36 million Ponzi scheme via Hulaman, Global Dominion, and Cornerstone, involving about 400 victims.
Convictions arose from securities fraud, multiple counts of wire and mail fraud, and fifteen money-laundering counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1957; charges spanned 1998–2002 with later trial in 2008.
Money transfers included offshore and domestic movements, including Bank Crozier to Bush-controlled accounts, used to fund personal expenses and alleged charitable activities.
To fund Cabo San Quintin, Bush promoted high-yield notes, misrepresented risk, and used various entities to hold investor funds, with statements showing inflated returns.
After trial, Bush was convicted on 27 of 32 counts and the district court sentenced him to 360 months with restitution; he appealed challenging sufficiency of evidence and jury instructions.
The Ninth Circuit addressed whether Santos merger concerns apply to § 1957 transactional money laundering and whether the district court erred in not giving an advice-of-counsel instruction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether there was sufficient evidence for § 1957 convictions	Bush contends 'proceeds' must mean 'profits' to avoid merger problems.	Santos applies and the government failed to prove profits were laundered separate from the fraud.	Evidence sufficient; no merger problem; conviction upheld.
Whether Santos applies to § 1957 transactions	Santos should apply to money laundering generally, including § 1957.	Santos does not apply to § 1957 or merger issues; different statute, different analysis.	Santos applies to § 1957; but lack of merger defeats relief; convictions affirmed.
Whether there was merger between money laundering and fraud offenses	Proceeds could be profits, creating a merger with fraud counts.	Transactions were not central to the fraud scheme; merger does not apply.	No merger; the money-laundering charges are distinct and supported by the record.
Whether the district court erred by not giving an advice-of-counsel instruction	Advise-of-counsel evidence should negate intent to defraud if disclosed and followed.	No factual basis; Grant was not Bush's attorney; record supported good-faith instruction instead.	No error; broader good-faith instruction sufficiently covered the issue.

United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (U.S. 2008) (proceeds and merger problem in money laundering contexts)
United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2009) (proceeds meaning profits where merger issues arise)
United States v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (central-to-scheme framework for money laundering)
United States v. Kratt, 579 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2009) (merger implications of § 1957 in relation to § 1956)
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1999) (scheme-to-defraud framework; focus on elements of crime)
United States v. Ibarra-Alcarez, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987) (advice-of-counsel instruction requirements)
United States v. Mason, 902 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1990) (limits on excluding defense theories when not supported by law)
United States v. Crandall, 525 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversal and affirmance standards for jury instructions)
United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (knowledge element considerations in § 1957/1956 context)