United States v. Burrows, 905 F.3d 1061

Secret Service agents downloaded eight child‑pornography images from a peer‑to‑peer network tied to an IP address assigned to William Burrows; a search of his home recovered numerous files and videos of prepubescent children.
Burrows admitted he had thousands of images and dozens of videos before allegedly deleting most ten days earlier.
A grand jury indicted Burrows for knowingly receiving three digital files of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A); he pleaded guilty conditionally, reserving a vagueness challenge.
At sentencing the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 121–155 months, imposed the low end (121 months), and explained the sentence addressed seriousness, general deterrence, and concerns about recidivism; it also referenced the opportunity for sex‑offender treatment while incarcerated and imposed lifetime supervised release.
On appeal Burrows argued (1) § 2252A(a)(2)(A) is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to distinguish receipt from possession and invites arbitrary enforcement, and (2) the district court violated Tapia by lengthening his prison term to promote rehabilitation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 2252A(a)(2)(A) is unconstitutionally vague	Burrows: statute fails to distinguish receiving from possessing, giving inadequate notice and inviting arbitrary enforcement	Government: receiving and possessing are distinct offenses; prior precedents support clarity and prosecutorial discretion	Court: statute not void for vagueness; reaffirmed Watzman — receipt and possession are sufficiently distinct
Whether sentencing violated Tapia (no prison term may be imposed/lengthened to promote rehabilitation)	Burrows: judge relied in part on need for sex‑offender treatment when choosing prison length	Government: district court discussed rehabilitation opportunities but did not base sentence length on them	Court: plain‑error review; no Tapia violation — court permissibly discussed treatment and did not impose/lengthen term for rehabilitation

United States v. Watzman, 486 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 2007) (rejected vagueness challenge; distinguished receipt from possession)
United States v. Dunning, 857 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2017) (held § 2252A not vague and emphasized nonproducers can possess without receiving)
Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011) (holding courts may not impose or lengthen prison terms to promote rehabilitation)
Batchelder v. United States, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (government may prosecute under either of multiple statutes violated)
United States v. Peel, 595 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2010) (possession requires scienter)
Whatley v. Zatecky, 833 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2016) (example of vagueness where statutory term lacked objective standard)