United States v. Bruno-Campos, 978 F.3d 801

Background

On Nov. 1, 2017, police stopped a white Kia reported stolen; passengers had multiple firearms and large-capacity magazines, including two Glock pistols modified to fire automatically and numerous rounds across several magazines.
A federal grand jury charged Heri E. Bruno-Campos with possession of a machine gun (18 U.S.C. § 922(o)); he pleaded guilty.
The PSR recommended a guidelines range (GSR) of 41–51 months; Bruno initially sought 60 months, then moved to 41 months.
At sentencing the government sought an upward variance to 60 months and the prosecutor speculated—without evidence—that the defendants may have been traveling to commit murder.
The district court adopted the PSR calculations but imposed an upward variance to 60 months, citing Bruno’s criminal history, temporal proximity of offenses, risk of recidivism, and the substantial firepower/ammunition.
On appeal the First Circuit found the prosecutor’s murder-plot conjecture improper but concluded it did not cause prejudice; it affirmed the 60-month sentence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Double counting of factors	Government contended facts (multiple machine guns, magazines, ammo, recidivism) justified an above-range variance beyond guideline heartland.	Bruno argued the court double-counted conduct and criminal history already reflected in the GSR.	No error: court explained how facts (multiple machine guns, large ammo, rapid reoffending) removed case from guideline heartland and justified variance.
Contamination of record / prosecutorial speculation	Gov't said prosecutor's remarks were background to explain police presence and acknowledged lack of proof.	Bruno said prosecutor improperly speculated he was involved in a murder plot, contaminating the record and influencing sentence.	Prosecutor's speculation was improper, but no plain error: record shows the judge did not rely on the comment and there was no prejudice.
Substantive reasonableness / sentencing disparity	Government maintained 60 months was reasonable given recidivism risk and dangerousness of the weapons/ammo.	Bruno argued the 60-month above-GSR sentence was substantively unreasonable and created unwarranted disparity.	Abuse-of-discretion review: sentence was reasonable—court gave an adequate rationale and the nine-month variance was modest and defensible; disparity claim undeveloped and rejected.
Notice / being blindsided at sentencing	Government noted the alleged murder-plot was in the affidavit and plea colloquy, so Bruno had notice.	Bruno claimed he was blindsided by the government’s sentencing statements about the plot.	Claim insubstantial: the remark appeared in earlier filings; no plain error shown.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Kilmartin, 944 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 2019) (cautionary principle about prosecutorial overreach at sentencing)
United States v. Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2020) (when facts differ from guideline heartland, a variance may be justified)
United States v. Madsen, 809 F.3d 712 (1st Cir. 2016) (prosecutors must not indulge in speculation at sentencing)
United States v. Stinefast, 724 F.3d 925 (7th Cir. 2013) (improper statements harmless where court did not rely on them)
United States v. Zapata, 1 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1993) (double-counting is not necessarily reversible error)
United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2006) (sentencing court must explain why defendant’s case differs from guideline ordinary case)
Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762 (2020) (standard of appellate review for sentencing reasonableness)