United States v. Brown
935 F.3d 43
2d Cir.2019Background
- Lawrence Brown was convicted of two Hobbs Act robberies (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and two related § 924(c) firearms offenses for brandishing and a subsequent offense requiring a 25‑year consecutive minimum.
- At sentencing the PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 70–87 months for the robbery counts; defense requested one‑day sentences on each robbery count because mandatory consecutive § 924(c) terms would produce a severe aggregate sentence.
- The district court imposed concurrent 84‑month sentences on the robbery counts and mandatory consecutive 7‑ and 25‑year terms on the § 924(c) counts, totaling 39 years. The court did not state whether it considered the § 924(c) mandatory minimums when setting robbery sentences.
- The Second Circuit previously barred consideration of § 924(c) consecutive minimums when sentencing predicate counts in United States v. Chavez, but the Supreme Court in Dean v. United States held district courts may consider such mandatory consecutive sentences.
- The panel determined Dean abrogated Chavez, raising uncertainty whether Judge Román knew he had discretion to consider the § 924(c) consequences when sentencing the robbery counts. The case was remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a sentencing court may consider the severity of mandatory consecutive § 924(c) minimums when setting sentences for predicate offenses | United States: Dean allows consideration; no error if court exercises discretion consistent with law | Brown: Court should have imposed minimal robbery sentences in light of harsh mandatory § 924(c) consecutive terms | Dean abrogated Chavez; district courts may consider § 924(c) mandatory consecutive minimums but are not required to do so (discretion to consider) |
| Appropriate appellate disposition when record is unclear whether the sentencing judge knew of Dean discretion: remand for clarification or for resentencing | United States: (implicitly) clarification may suffice if judge actually understood discretion | Brown: (implicitly) remand for resentencing to ensure correct exercise of discretion and address First Step Act argument | Court opts to remand for resentencing given the unusual circumstances (Chavez had not been disavowed by the Circuit, counsel and Probation did not mention Dean) |
Key Cases Cited
- Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017) (Supreme Court held sentencing courts may consider mandatory consecutive § 924(c) minimums when sentencing predicate offenses)
- United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2008) (Second Circuit had previously precluded consideration of § 924(c) mandatory consecutive minimums)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (principle that decisions on direct review apply retroactively to cases on direct appeal)
- Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (new rules of constitutional law apply to cases on direct review)
- United States v. Preacely, 628 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussion of when to remand for clarification versus resentencing)
- United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994) (procedure for restoring appellate jurisdiction after resentencing)
