United States v. Brown
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1684
1st Cir.2011Background
- Brown, housed at Pharos House in Maine, was suspected as a drug supplier after a controlled buy of 2.4 grams of cocaine in January 2004.
- He was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); retried in 2006 after a mistrial in the first trial.
- The PSR initially classified Brown as a career offender based on a 1999 federal cocaine trafficking conviction and a 1989 Massachusetts burglary conviction under ch. 266, § 16.
- At sentencing in 2006, the district court treated the Massachusetts burglary as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2), producing a guideline range of 262–327 months.
- This court later overruled prior circuit law in Giggey I on how to treat non-residential burglary under the residual clause, affecting Brown’s predicate status on remand.
- On remand, the district court determined Brown’s Massachusetts conviction fell under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 16 but did not satisfy the residual clause as a crime of violence, imposing a 75-month sentence instead of the career-offender range.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause covers Brown's MA §16 burglary. | United States contends the statute is a crime of violence. | Brown argues §16 does not categorically meet the residual clause. | No; §16 does not satisfy the residual clause as applied here. |
| Whether Giggey I governs the categorization of Brown's non-residential burglary. | United States relies on Giggey I to treat non-dwelling burglary as a crime of violence. | Brown argues Giggey I should not convert the offense for this analysis. | Giggey I framework applied; offense not a crime of violence under residual clause. |
| Whether Brown's sentence is unreasonable without the career-offender designation. | United States justifies a longer sentence due to extensive recidivism. | Brown contends the 75-month sentence is excessive absent career-offender status. | Sentence affirmed; not an error and within Court’s discretionary range. |
| Whether the appeal is moot due to Brown's release during the appeal. | United States maintains live dispute over the sentence and conduct. | Brown argues mootness forecloses relief. | Mootness did not negate review; merits resolved against Brown. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Sawyer, 144 F.3d 191 (1st Cir. 1998) (per se crime-of-violence treatment considerations)
- United States v. Fiore, 983 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992) (early framing of 4B1.2(a)(2) considerations)
- United States v. Giggey, 551 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2008) (en banc; residual clause framework for non-dwelling burglary)
- United States v. Giggey, 589 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2009) (Giggey II; Shepard-based offense identification)
- United States v. Almenas, 553 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2009) (categorical approach to predicate offenses)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (U.S. 2008) (guidelines similarity-in-kind and risk inquiry for residual clause)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (U.S. 2005) (deferential standard for reviewing sentences after Booker)
- Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (U.S. 1992) (mootness doctrine relevance in appellate review)