United States v. Brown, 2:17-mj-06204

FBI undercover operation: a Chandler Police Task Force officer created a virtual female persona on social media; both the officer and defendant were located in Arizona during all interactions.
Between April 4 and May 4, 2017, defendant communicated with the persona, instructed her how to enter prostitution, discussed pricing, condom use, and hiring him as a pimp.
Defendant told the persona to buy a bus ticket to Phoenix, gave a Phoenix bus-stop pickup location and his phone number, and assured he would pick her up.
At the scheduled arrival time, defendant sent a Lyft driver to pick up the persona; the Lyft driver provided defendant’s address to FBI, and officers arrested defendant at that Arizona address with the phone used for texts.
No one actually traveled from New Mexico to Arizona; defendant did not purchase or provide the bus ticket or funds.
Procedural posture: criminal complaint charging attempt to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (interstate transportation for prostitution); defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; preliminary hearing held and matter submitted to magistrate judge.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether court has subject-matter jurisdiction given no interstate travel	Federal statutes (and courts) permit prosecution; interstate-nexus element goes to merits not jurisdiction	No interstate nexus occurred (all acts in Arizona; no one actually crossed state lines), so statute’s jurisdictional predicate not met	Denied — interstate-nexus element is substantive; absence of alleged travel does not deprive federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction
Whether probable cause exists that defendant attempted to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (intent and substantial step)	Communications, inducement, providing pickup via Lyft and arranging meeting show culpable intent and substantial step toward transporting for prostitution	Actions were only persuasion/inducement; defendant did not physically transport, buy ticket, or send money — insufficient for a substantial step	Denied — court found probable cause for both intent and that defendant took a substantial step (directions, arranging pickup) constituting a ‘‘true commitment’’ toward the crime

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Commerce Clause limits on federal regulation)
United States v. Ward, 914 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1990) (attempt requires culpable intent and substantial step)
United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1995) (substantial-step standard: actions must cross preparation/attempt line)
Brown v. United States, 314 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1963) (one may be the effective cause of interstate movement without physically carrying the person)
Ratigan v. United States, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (jurisdictional element of federal crimes is not necessarily jurisdictional in constitutional sense)
Hugi v. United States, 164 F.3d 378 (7th Cir. 1999) (interstate nexus affects substantive authority, not court jurisdiction)
United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2008) (attempt punishable where conduct shows intent and capability even if plan thwarted)
United States v. Jones, 909 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (one need not physically carry a person interstate to ‘transport’ her under Mann Act principles)
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (preliminary hearing is limited to probable-cause determination)
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding Mann Act under Commerce Clause)
United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 (1877) (criminal acts must relate to execution of a federal power to become federal offenses)