United States v. Browder
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14549
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Browder pleaded guilty in 2010 to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 6.5 years imprisonment and 10 years supervised release.
- Special conditions of supervised release included: (1) participation in the Probation Office’s Computer/Internet Monitoring Program; (2) enrollment in a mental-health program for sexual offenders; and (3) no deliberate contact with minors under 18, excluding his biological/adopted children.
- Upon release, Probation sought to implement its district computer-monitoring policy (using a third-party vendor, Remote.com) and presented Browder a written monitoring agreement describing broad keystroke/traffic capture. Browder objected as overbroad.
- Browder attended at least two treatment sessions but refused to sign the treatment-provider agreement because it barred contact with anyone under 17 unless approved by probation and the treatment team — a requirement that, he argued, conflicted with the court-ordered exclusion for his children. The provider would not modify the agreement.
- Probation filed a violation petition alleging breaches of the computer-monitoring and treatment conditions; the District Court found violations and imposed time served, reinstating the supervised-release conditions. Browder appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (U.S.) | Defendant's Argument (Browder) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity/reasonableness of the Probation Office computer-monitoring implementation | Monitoring policy was appropriate to enforce the court condition and protect the public | Policy as implemented (broad capture by third-party) was an unreasonable/deeper deprivation of liberty than necessary | Court affirmed: as implemented here (narrowed by third-party screening for contraband) monitoring was reasonable; directed district court to restate terms with greater specificity |
| Whether Browder’s refusal to sign the treatment-provider agreement violated the treatment condition | Failure to sign and thus participate justified revocation | Refusal was reasonable because the provider’s agreement added a broader no-contact restriction (including his children) that conflicted with the judge’s sentence | Court reversed: Browder reasonably objected to a treatment term that contradicted his sentence; finding of violation on this ground was an abuse of discretion |
| Sufficiency of evidence for revocation | Evidence supported that Browder refused to comply with both conditions | Browder challenged sufficiency | Court: sufficiency challenge fails for monitoring claim (preponderance standard satisfied), but treatment-violation finding reversed on legal error (not merely lack of evidence) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir.) (computer-monitoring conditions must be narrowly tailored)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (reasonableness review of sentencing decisions)
- United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015) (district court exclusively imposes special conditions; limited delegation allowed for minor details)
- United States v. Glenn, 744 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 2014) (standard of review for supervised-release revocation findings)