United States v. Brooks
ACM S32394
| A.F.C.C.A. | Mar 22, 2017Background
- Appellant, an AMSA Course Phase II preceptor at Joint Base Langley‑Eustis, engaged in a sexual relationship with student A1C JR in late 2014 and denied the conduct during an AFOSI interview.
- After the interview, Appellant was temporarily assigned to a different squadron and told to return to his unit on 2 February 2015; he largely failed to report for duty from 2 February to 8 May 2015.
- During that absence Appellant made occasional, brief appearances at his unit for training or events when requested, and he responded to supervisor inquiries in a manner that fostered the impression he was still assigned elsewhere.
- Appellant pleaded guilty at a special court‑martial to AWOL (Article 86), dereliction of duty (Article 92), and false official statement (Article 107); sentence included a bad‑conduct discharge, two months confinement, forfeitures, and reduction to E‑1.
- On appeal Appellant raised (1) improvident plea to AWOL given his intermittent appearances, (2) improper SJA solicitation of a victim statement from A1C JR, and (3) post‑trial processing delay exceeding the Moreno standard; the court also considered a plainly erroneous omission of Appellant’s overseas service in the SJAR/PDS.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Providency of AWOL plea (2 Feb–8 May 2015) | Appellant argued his intermittent returns for trainings terminated the absence under Gudaitis and thus plea was improvident | Short, directed appearances did not establish voluntary termination because Appellant did not disclose AWOL status and supervisors had no reason to know | Court: No substantial basis to question plea; plea providently accepted |
| SJA solicitation of victim statement from A1C JR | Appellant argued JR was not a "victim" so solicitation was improper | Government: definition of victim is broad; solicitation was proper and JR did not submit a statement anyway | Court: No error; solicitation permissible and no prejudice shown |
| Post‑trial delay (action‑to‑docket exceeded Moreno by 7 days) | Appellant sought modest relief (reduce reduction to E‑1) under Tardif due to Moreno violation | Government attributed oversight to manning/turnover, argued delay was minor | Court: Facial Moreno breach but no due process violation and Tardif relief not warranted given limited delay and no prejudice |
| SJAR/PDS omission of overseas service | Appellant claimed plain error in omitting Qatar deployment from PDS/SJAR, seeking new post‑trial processing | Government conceded error but argued no possible prejudice to clemency | Court: Error was plain and obvious but no colorable showing of prejudice; no relief granted |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Moon, 73 M.J. 382 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (standard for substantial basis to question guilty plea)
- United States v. Gudaitis, 18 M.J. 816 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984) (test for voluntary termination of unauthorized absence)
- United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (presumptive standards for unreasonable post‑trial delay)
- United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (Article 66(c) remedial relief for post‑trial delay)
- United States v. LeBlanc, 74 M.J. 650 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (post‑trial processing errors and requirement to show colorable prejudice)
- United States v. Blouin, 74 M.J. 247 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (standard of review for accepting guilty pleas)
- United States v. Scalo, 60 M.J. 435 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (prejudice requirement for post‑trial error challenges)