United States v. Brooks
736 F.3d 921
| 10th Cir. | 2013Background
- FBI investigated a Kansas City neighborhood in 2010 after controlled buys identified three nearby houses (the "Spot" at 2632 and adjacent addresses) as drug-distribution hubs; Antonio Quinn was identified as the central supplier.
- Marcus Quinn ("Quinn") and Mark Brooks were arrested during a multi‑jurisdiction raid; both tried and convicted on conspiracy and related drug charges; Antonio pled guilty and received a 25‑year sentence (did not testify); several cooperating witnesses pleaded guilty and testified for the government.
- The government’s lead investigator, FBI Agent Timothy Swanson, gave extensive overview/opinion testimony about the investigation, roles of participants, and the proffer process; defendants objected on appeal that this testimony usurped the jury and vouched for witnesses.
- Lavaughn Brown and other cooperating witnesses testified about supply relationships, shared use of the Spot, controlled buys, and wiretap evidence linking defendants to the conspiracy; Brown had prior proffer statements and hoped for a sentence reduction.
- The jury convicted Brooks and Quinn on all counts presented; PSRs attributed over 4.5 kg of crack to the conspiracy, producing total offense levels of 42 and guideline ranges of 30 years to life; Brooks received 35 years, Quinn 30 years.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Agent Swanson’s overview/opinion testimony | Gov: overview testimony was permissible to explain investigation and investigative techniques | Brooks/Quinn: testimony previewed evidence, opined on guilt/roles and usurped jury, and should have been excluded | Court: no plain error; testimony largely within permissible overview or rebuttal after defendants opened the door; limited abuse concerns but no reversible error |
| Bolstering / vouching for cooperating witnesses via proffer testimony | Gov: proffer testimony explained procedure and rebutted cross-examination attacks | Brooks/Quinn: Swanson’s statements about gauging truthfulness and consistency impermissibly vouched for witnesses | Court: admission was rebuttal to issues defendants raised; not impermissible vouching; prior‑consistent aspects were not improper hearsay or were harmless |
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy conviction (Quinn) | Gov: circumstantial evidence, controlled buys, cooperator testimony, wiretaps, shared supply/costs support agreement and interdependence | Quinn: evidence shows only independent sales or mere buyer‑seller relationships, not an agreement or interdependence | Court: viewing evidence in government’s favor, a reasonable jury could infer agreement and interdependence; conviction upheld |
| Admission of Quinn’s prior drug conviction (Rule 404(b)) | Gov: prior conviction and co‑activity with coconspirators show intent, relationship basis, and knowledge — a proper non‑propensity purpose | Quinn: prior conviction was too remote or only for distribution (not conspiracy) and unduly prejudicial | Court: admissible under Rule 404(b) for proper purpose, relevant (similar activity), not unfairly prejudicial, and accompanied by limiting instruction |
| Sentencing challenges (procedural & substantive) | Defendants: various Guideline and enhancement disputes (quantity attribution, protected‑location enhancement, use of prior conviction, disparity with co‑defendant Antonio) | Gov: Guideline calculations supported by record; plea agreement differences explain disparities; defendants’ specific objections inadequately briefed or meritless | Court: sentences procedurally and substantively reasonable; no reversible error; within‑Guidelines presumption applies |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. McSwain, 197 F.3d 472 (10th Cir. 1999) (expert testimony on participants’ roles may assist jury in complex distribution networks)
- United States v. Pinelli, 890 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1989) (permitting expert testimony about roles in illegal enterprise)
- United States v. Ray, 370 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2004) (framework for admitting summary testimony and charts; balance of helpfulness vs. prejudice and specialized‑knowledge requirement)
- United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2003) (defines overview testimony and warns of its risks)
- United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (limitations on overview/opinion testimony and limiting instructions reduce prejudice)
- United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2004) (overview testimony risks government imprimatur and usurping jury credibility determinations)
- Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995) (prior consistent statements admissible to rebut charge of recent fabrication only when premotive rule satisfied)
- United States v. Jones, 468 F.3d 704 (10th Cir. 2006) (proffer testimony about gauging truthfulness did not amount to guarantees of veracity)