151 F. Supp. 3d 31
D.D.C.2015Background
- Five protesters (Bronstein, Kresling, Mrabet, Rodriguez, Saffle) stood up and spoke during a Supreme Court oral-argument session on April 1, 2015, after being warned to remain silent; each was removed and arrested.
- The government charged them in a two-count information: Count One under 18 U.S.C. § 1507 (demonstrating in/near a federal courthouse) and Count Two under 18 U.S.C. § 6134 (making a “harangue or oration” or uttering “loud, threatening, or abusive language” in the Supreme Court Building or grounds).
- After briefing, the government limited Count Two to conduct inside the Supreme Court Building and dropped references to “threatening” or “abusive” language and to the grounds.
- Defendants moved to dismiss Count Two as facially vague (Due Process) and overbroad (First Amendment); they ultimately pursued only vagueness challenges.
- The district court evaluated whether the statutory terms “loud,” “harangue,” and “oration” are unconstitutionally vague in all applications or as-applied to the defendants’ courtroom interruptions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 6134’s prohibition of “loud” language is unconstitutionally vague | Gov: not raised as to grounds; prosecution limited to building; term can be limited to speech that disturbs court operations | Defs: “loud” gives no objective criteria; invites arbitrary enforcement by police | Court: “loud” is vague in isolation but can be given a limiting construction — prohibits utterances that disturb or tend to disturb the normal operations of the Supreme Court (prosecution allowed on that basis) |
| Whether prohibition of “harangue” is unconstitutionally vague | Gov: urges ordinary dictionary meaning (forceful/angry speech) | Defs: term is archaic, multi‑meaning, subjective; no settled legal definition; vests discretion in enforcers | Court: “harangue” is unconstitutionally vague in all its applications; dismissal as to this term |
| Whether prohibition of “oration” is unconstitutionally vague | Gov: urges ordinary dictionary meaning (formal speech) | Defs: “oration”’s alleged formality is subjective; no clear legal definition; ordinary person lacks notice | Court: “oration” is unconstitutionally vague in all its applications; dismissal as to this term |
| Whether the defendants can be prosecuted despite facial vagueness challenges because their conduct was clearly proscribed | Gov: defendants’ interruptions plainly fall within § 6134’s core | Defs: facial invalidity prevents enforcement in all applications | Court: where a narrowing construction is available (for “loud”), prosecution may proceed; but where no principled limiting construction exists (“harangue,” “oration”), those terms are invalid and cannot support prosecution |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (defines vagueness concerns and need for settled legal meanings)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (facial vagueness doctrine and standardlessness)
- Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (more stringent vagueness test where First Amendment interests implicated)
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (upholding nuisance/noise rule as limited by impact on normal activities)
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (requirement to consider limiting constructions before invalidating statutes)
- Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (distinction between facial and as‑applied vagueness challenges)
- Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (no statute can be vague in all applications; need for ascertainable standards)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (vagueness strikes where statute vests arbitrary discretion)
- City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (invalidating vague loitering standard)