United States v. Brissette
919 F.3d 670
| 1st Cir. | 2019Background
- In 2014 Boston officials Kenneth Brissette and Timothy Sullivan allegedly pressured a festival promoter (Crash Line) to hire members of IATSE Local 11 by threatening to withhold required city permits. Crash Line then contracted for additional union workers and received the permits.
- Defendants were indicted for Hobbs Act extortion and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2), charged under the prong involving inducing consent by wrongful use of fear (economic harm).
- The district court proposed jury instructions requiring that, if a defendant caused the victim to transfer property to a third party, the government must show the defendant personally benefited from that transfer to satisfy the Hobbs Act "obtaining of property" element.
- The government proffered evidence of political/administrative benefits but conceded it might be insufficient under the district court’s personal-benefit formulation; defendants moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the indictment on that legal basis.
- On appeal, the First Circuit reviewed de novo whether directing a victim to transfer property to a third party satisfies the Hobbs Act’s "obtaining of property" element absent proof the defendant personally benefited, and whether forced payment for actual (not fictitious) labor can qualify.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (United States) | Defendant's Argument (Brissette / Sullivan) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hobbs Act "obtaining of property" requires defendant to personally benefit when directing transfer to a third party | No personal-benefit requirement; directing transfer to another suffices to show "obtaining" | Must show defendant personally benefited from transfer to satisfy "obtaining" | Rejected personal-benefit requirement; directing transfer to an identified third party can satisfy "obtaining" |
| Whether Sekhar bars Hobbs Act liability when defendant forces an actor to do what the defendant wants (i.e., coerced action rather than acquisition of property) | Hobbs Act covers coerced transfers of property (wages) even if work is real; Sekhar does not displace earlier precedent | Sekhar requires that the defendant actually acquire property (distinguishing coerced non-property conduct) so indictment fails | Sekhar does not preclude Hobbs Act liability here; directed payments of wages can be "obtaining of property" |
| Whether forced payment of wages for actual (not fictitious) work can satisfy "obtaining of property" | Yes—precedent (Enmons, Kemble, Green) permits extortion liability for forced payment of wages even if work is real | Argues Hobbs Act should reach only fictitious/unearned wages (per narrow readings) | Held that forced payments for real work can satisfy "obtaining"; no requirement wages be fictitious |
Key Cases Cited
- Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (interpreting "obtaining of property" by reference to common law and the Model Penal Code)
- Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729 (2013) (holding Hobbs Act requires acquisition of property, distinguishing coercion absent property acquisition)
- United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956) (Hobbs Act extortion does not depend on direct benefit to the extortioner)
- United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973) (Hobbs Act can reach forced wage payments exacted by union officials)
- United States v. Burhoe, 871 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) (addressing wrongfulness and Hobbs Act extortion in union wage-exaction context)