United States v. Brinson
772 F.3d 1314
| 10th Cir. | 2014Background
- Undercover officer arranged and met C.H. (a minor) in a motel room after responding to a Backpage escort ad; C.H. received texts from a contact "Twin" warning that police were present.
- Officers observed a black SUV with a "Jani-King" logo linger near the room; motel records showed Room 123 was rented to Tarran Brinson and contained his photo ID.
- Officers located Brinson in a nearby motel parking lot; he admitted renting Room 123, owning the black SUV, and driving it past the room; he was arrested.
- At trial the government introduced expert testimony on prostitution, Facebook and text messages, undercover officer testimony recounting statements by an unidentified caller, a certificate authenticating debit-card records, and evidence seized after arrest.
- A jury convicted Brinson of six counts including sex trafficking of a child (18 U.S.C. § 1591), conspiracy, attempted sex trafficking, coercion/enticement (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)), use of interstate facilities in aid of racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)), and obstruction; the district court denied several defense evidentiary and sufficiency challenges; the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Brinson's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility/qualification of expert on prostitution | Testimony would not aid jurors and was unreliable because not based on case facts | Expert provided specialized background on jargon, pimp/prostitute methods, internet/cellphone use useful to jurors | Aff'd — district court did not abuse discretion; expert testimony helpful and reliable for general background |
| Admission of Facebook and text messages | Messages were hearsay and violated Confrontation Clause | Facebook messages were party-opponent statements; text-message challenge not properly identified/waived | Aff'd — Facebook messages admissible as party-opponent; text-message claim waived for inadequate briefing |
| Admission of unidentified declarant statements to undercover officer | Hearsay and testimonial (Confrontation Clause) | Statements offered to explain officer’s actions and were non-testimonial; not offered for truth | Aff'd — statements not hearsay (not offered for truth) and not testimonial, so no Confrontation Clause violation |
| Admission of certification authenticating debit-card records | Certificate was testimonial; admitting it violated Confrontation Clause | Rule 902(11) authentication certificates are non-testimonial and merely authenticate records | Aff'd — certificate non-testimonial under controlling precedent (Rule 902(11)); Confrontation Clause not implicated |
| Probable cause for arrest / suppression of post-arrest evidence | Arrest lacked probable cause; evidence should be suppressed | Officers had facts (texts warning of police, SUV near room, rental records, admissions) supporting probable cause | Aff'd — probable cause existed; suppression denial proper |
| Sufficiency of evidence on substantive offenses | Evidence insufficient to support convictions | Trial evidence (motel rental/ID, SUV, messages, Facebook exchanges, witnesses) supported elements | Aff'd — reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on six counts |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir.) (abuse-of-discretion standard for expert testimony)
- Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (preponderance standard to admit co-conspirator statements and to link a defendant to a statement)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause prohibits admission of testimonial hearsay without opportunity for cross-examination)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (forensic affidavits can be testimonial)
- United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673 (10th Cir.) (Rule 902(11) certifications authenticating records are non-testimonial)
- Solorio-Tafolla v. United States, 324 F.3d 964 (8th Cir.) (expert testimony may be necessary to explain prostitution terminology)
- United States v. Zamudio-Carrillo, 499 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir.) (probable cause standard for arrests)
