909 F.3d 716
4th Cir.2018Background
- MDENT agents began investigating Terry after finding drug remnants in trash tied to his residence and obtained a warrant to search the residence.
- On April 18, 2016, after encountering Terry at a store, agents smelled marijuana; Terry surrendered a small amount and received a misdemeanor citation. While this occurred, an MDENT agent secretly placed a GPS tracker on Terry’s gold Kia without a warrant.
- Later the same day Terry permitted a residence search (yielded nothing); Corporal Johnson then obtained a magistrate warrant to “ping” Terry’s phone and place the GPS tracker, failing to disclose that the tracker had already been affixed.
- Two days later agents used GPS data to follow the Kia; after the car returned to West Virginia they observed (and confirmed via GPS) a speeding violation, stopped the vehicle, and discovered 195.5 grams of methamphetamine on Terry.
- Terry moved to suppress evidence as fruit of an unlawful warrantless GPS search; the district court found a flagrant constitutional violation but denied suppression for lack of Terry’s standing. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding Terry had standing and that attenuation did not purge the taint, vacating the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge warrantless GPS placement | Terry was the driver when the tracker was placed and thus had standing to challenge the vehicle search | Government argued Terry lacked standing at time of the April 20 stop because he had relinquished control of the Kia | Court: Terry had standing because he drove the Kia when tracker was placed (citing Rusher) |
| Whether evidence from traffic stop was fruit of illegal GPS search | The methamphetamine was discovered as a direct result of unlawful GPS tracking; suppression required | Government argued speeding stop was an intervening circumstance that attenuated the taint | Court: Attenuation factors favor suppression; the speeding stop did not purge the taint |
| Application of Brown v. Illinois attenuation factors | Terry: temporal proximity, lack of meaningful intervening circumstances, and flagrancy of misconduct weigh for exclusion | Government: two-day lapse and the speeding violation break the causal chain | Court: Two-day lapse was insubstantial; speeding was tied to GPS data; flagrancy of deliberate warrantless tracking required suppression |
| Whether Sprinkle compels a different result | Terry: distinguishing facts — GPS-directed surveillance here vs. independent criminal act in Sprinkle | Government: relied on Sprinkle to argue attenuation | Court: Sprinkle distinguishable; no bright-line rule; facts here require suppression |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (installation of a tracking device on a vehicle is a Fourth Amendment search)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (exclusionary rule and the ‘‘fruit of the poisonous tree’’ doctrine)
- Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (three-factor attenuation test for purging taint)
- Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (attenuation analysis and role of intervening circumstances/warrants)
- United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170 (4th Cir. 2012) (attenuation and evaluation of taint)
- United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2007) (suppression principles for derivative evidence)
- United States v. Andrews, 577 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2009) (exclusionary rule scope)
- United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1992) (driver has standing to challenge vehicle search despite not owning vehicle)
- United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 1997) (distinguishable attenuation analysis where defendant committed independent violent crime)
- Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (limits of attenuation where nexus between illegality and evidence remains strong)
