953 F.3d 838
5th Cir.2020Background
- Phea was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) for prostituting a 14‑year‑old (count alleged Phea actually knew the victim was under 18).
- The Government abandoned the actual‑knowledge theory at trial and proposed a jury instruction based on § 1591(c) ("reasonable opportunity to observe").
- The district court instructed the jury on the § 1591(c) theory (language not in the indictment); trial counsel did not object; Government pressed that theory in closing.
- The jury convicted Phea; the Fifth Circuit affirmed on direct appeal reviewing for plain error because no trial objection was made.
- Phea filed a § 2255 ineffective‑assistance claim arguing trial (and appellate) counsel should have objected to the constructive amendment of the indictment.
- The Fifth Circuit reversed the § 1591(a) conviction, holding trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the constructive amendment and that prejudice under Strickland was shown.
Issues
| Issue | Phea's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court’s instructions constructively amended the indictment | Instruction substituted §1591(c) "reasonable opportunity to observe" for the indictment’s alleged actual‑knowledge element, so indictment was constructively amended | No prejudicial error at trial; earlier appeal had been reviewed for plain error and affirmed | Constructive amendment occurred because the instruction eliminated the scienter charged in the indictment |
| Whether trial counsel’s failure to object was constitutionally deficient | Counsel was deficient for not objecting to an obvious constructive amendment | Counsel not deficient given uncertainty of controlling precedent | Counsel was deficient: failure to object fell below objective standard of reasonableness |
| Whether Phea suffered Strickland prejudice | If counsel had objected, reasonable probability jury would have had doubt about actual knowledge (evidence supported that doubt) | No prejudice — conviction would stand under the facts | Prejudice shown: reasonable probability the jury would have doubted the actual‑knowledge theory; verdict undermined |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part ineffective‑assistance test: deficiency and prejudice)
- United States v. Scher, 601 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2010) (defines constructive amendment of an indictment)
- United States v. Doucet, 994 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1993) (discusses constructive amendment/variance principles)
- United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2007) (jury instruction altering scienter modified an essential element)
- United States v. Chambers, 408 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2005) (constructive amendments ordinarily reversible per se)
- Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019) (Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of counsel)
- United States v. Phea, 755 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2014) (prior panel opinion affirming conviction on plain‑error review)
