United States v. Braxton, 1:09-cr-00478

Background

Savino Braxton initially pleaded guilty (Feb. 2013) to possession with intent to distribute >1 kg heroin; plea was vacated by the Fourth Circuit (Apr. 2015) for a Rule 11 error.
After remand the government filed a 21 U.S.C. § 851 notice raising a mandatory minimum to 240 months; Braxton elected to proceed to trial pro se with standby counsel.
Braxton was convicted at a July 2015 trial of possession with intent to distribute and sentenced to the 240‑month mandatory minimum.
Braxton filed multiple postconviction challenges (§ 2255, Brady, coram nobis, motions for new trial), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), prosecutorial misconduct, and numerous trial-court errors.
The district court denied his § 2255 motion and related motions; the Fourth Circuit affirmed many aspects but remanded for the district court to enumerate Braxton’s claims and explain why each fails.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
IAC — Andrew Szekely (appellate & standby)	Szekely raised the Rule 11 appeal against Braxton’s wishes and failed to subpoena a forensic chemist as standby counsel.	Szekely properly pursued the Rule 11 appeal with Braxton’s knowledge; he served subpoenas as directed and was not asked to subpoena a chemist.	Denied — record shows Braxton was informed/agreed on appeal; no prejudice shown from lack of chemist.
IAC — Steven Levin (appellate)	Levin omitted some issues on appeal that Braxton wanted raised.	Levin focused on the strongest arguments — standard appellate strategy; omitted claims were meritless.	Denied — winnowing arguments is sound appellate practice and no prejudice shown.
Prosecutorial misconduct — Brady / use of testimony and emails	Prosecution used perjured testimony, committed fraud at Brady hearing, withheld exculpatory evidence/emails.	Government presented emails refuting Braxton’s reweighing theory; emails were not exculpatory and no Brady violation occurred.	Denied — court found no impropriety or withheld Brady material.
Prosecutorial misconduct — trial statements (opening/closing)	Prosecutor’s remarks (evidence destruction, supervision status, remarks about sympathy/prison attire) were improper and prejudicial.	Remarks were corrected when misstated, were not improper or prejudicial, and some objections were withdrawn.	Denied — statements were minor, corrected, or nonprejudicial; claims defaulted if not raised on direct appeal.
Court error — drug‑weight theory (water content)	Court prevented Braxton from arguing weight should exclude water component of seized heroin.	Law requires measuring the mass of the mixture/substance; defendant could contest weight at trial and did so.	Denied — court correctly applied governing law and permitted challenge to weight.
Court error — denial to call witnesses/subpoenas (Judge Bennett, Tuminelli)	Court quashed/subpoenaed then excused these witnesses, blocking defense.	Judge Bennett had no relevant testimony; Tuminelli would have offered hearsay and no admissible non‑hearsay use was shown.	Denied — court properly excluded irrelevant/hearsay testimony.
Juror No. 2 / voir dire & abeyance request	Court failed to question Juror No. 2 after juror expressed confusion; Braxton sought to propound interrogatories and pause § 2255.	Court investigated, found no external influence, and found the juror’s confusion understandable; no Remmer trigger; no right to juror interrogatories.	Denied — no evidence of outside influence; abeyance request denied.
§ 851 notice / opportunity to challenge	Braxton claims he lacked sufficient opportunity to contest § 851 enhanced‑sentence notice.	Braxton moved to strike the notice, raised objections at sentencing, and previously litigated similar claims in coram nobis; the notice was substantively valid.	Denied — Braxton had adequate opportunity and the notice was valid.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part ineffective assistance standard)
Addonizio v. United States, 442 U.S. 178 (1979) (collateral attack requires fundamental defect to warrant relief)
Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962) (standards referenced for collateral relief)
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (claims omitted from direct appeal generally barred on collateral review)
United States v. Dyess, 730 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2013) (cannot relitigate claims properly raised on direct appeal in § 2255)
United States v. Linder, 552 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009) (same)
United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 1993) (standard for evaluating prosecutorial misconduct prejudice)
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (appellate counsel may winnow weaker issues)
Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (appellate advocacy standards)
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (requires investigation when extraneous influence on a juror is shown)
United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182 (4th Cir. 1995) (measuring mixture/substance mass for drug‑quantity determinations)
United States v. Beckton, 740 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2014) (district court control over witness examination and pro se testimony)
Pruett v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 1560 (4th Cir. 1993) (procedural default of prosecutorial‑misconduct claims)
Miller v. United States, 261 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1958) (burden of proof in § 2255 proceedings)