United States v. Bravo-Fernandez
3:10-cr-00232
D.P.R.Apr 10, 2017Background
- Bravo and Martinez were indicted on federal-program bribery charges (18 U.S.C. § 666) and tried together in 2011; convictions on the § 666 counts were later vacated by the First Circuit, which rejected a gratuity theory.
- The government intends to retry the defendants on counts four and five (standalone § 666 bribery charges). Remaining counts were resolved on appeal or earlier rulings.
- Bravo moves to sever arguing (1) De Castro‑Font may testify to Martinez statements that inculpate Bravo (Confrontation/Bruton issue) and (2) Martinez’s 1999 grand jury testimony would be unfairly prejudicial (spillover).
- Martinez moves to sever arguing (1) evidence of Bravo’s payments to De Castro‑Font will spill over and prejudice Martinez, and (2) De Castro‑Font may relay Bravo’s out‑of‑court statements that incriminate Martinez (Confrontation/Bruton issue).
- The court denied both motions without prejudice, finding severance premature as to evidentiary spillover and Bruton concerns because admission of the disputed statements is speculative.
- The court ordered the government to submit for in camera review by April 17, 2017 any defendant statements it intends to introduce at trial, and held Bruton issues in abeyance pending that disclosure.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Severance for spillover prejudice from Martinez’s 1999 grand jury testimony (Bravo) | Admission would be unfairly prejudicial to Bravo. | Joint trial acceptable; prejudice speculative unless evidence is admitted. | Denied without prejudice — premature; government hasn’t moved to admit the testimony. |
| Severance for spillover from Bravo’s payments to De Castro‑Font (Martinez) | Payments will "rub off" on Martinez and cause pervasive prejudice. | Evidence probative to Bravo; limiting instructions can mitigate spillover. | Denied — no showing of pervasive prejudice and limiting instructions adequate. |
| Severance based on Confrontation/Bruton (De Castro‑Font relaying Martinez statements against Bravo) | Such out‑of‑court statements are powerfully incriminating and the declarant may not testify, violating confrontation rights. | Bruton issues speculative; may be addressed by limiting instructions or redaction; government may choose not to call De Castro‑Font. | Held in abeyance — court orders government to produce any defendant statements it will use for in camera review before ruling on severance. |
| Severance based on Confrontation/Bruton (De Castro‑Font relaying Bravo statements against Martinez) | Similar Bruton claim: De Castro‑Font may repeat Bravo’s incriminating statements; Martinez cannot cross‑examine Bravo if Bravo doesn’t testify. | Same: speculative; redaction/limiting instructions may cure; must see what government intends to introduce. | Held in abeyance — same in camera disclosure order; denial without prejudice pending review. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (§ 666 targets bribes, not gratuities; reversed convictions based on gratuity theory)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (severance required only when joint trial would compromise specific trial right or prevent reliable judgment)
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (admission of non‑testifying co‑defendant’s confession can violate Confrontation Clause)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (limits admissibility of out‑of‑court testimonial statements under Confrontation Clause)
- United States v. O’Bryant, 998 F.2d 21 (1st Cir.) (wide discretion to deny severance; strong showing of prejudice required)
- United States v. Molina, 407 F.3d 511 (1st Cir.) (Bruton admissibility depends on whether jury can follow limiting instruction and whether statements are powerfully inculpatory)