United States v. Brandon Gravatt, 953 F.3d 258

The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised crack-cocaine quantity thresholds for statutory mandatory minimums; powder-cocaine thresholds were unchanged.
The First Step Act of 2018 made the Fair Sentencing Act's changes retroactive for prior sentences and defines a "covered offense" as a conviction under a statute whose penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act.
In 2001 Gravatt pled guilty to a multi-object conspiracy (21 U.S.C. §846) charging both 50+ grams of crack and 5+ kilograms of powder cocaine; he was sentenced, later reduced to 260 months.
Gravatt moved for First Step Act relief; the district court denied relief as ineligible because the powder-cocaine object independently supported the same statutory penalty range.
The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that a conviction that includes an offense provision modified by the Fair Sentencing Act qualifies as a "covered offense," so the district court must consider relief on the merits.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a multi-object conspiracy that includes a crack offense is a "covered offense" under §404(a)	Gravatt: yes — crack need not be the sole object; statute of conviction includes modified provision	Government: no — inclusion of an unmodified powder offense that independently sets the penalty precludes coverage	Court: yes — if the statute of conviction includes a provision modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, the offense is covered
Whether the district court properly denied review on eligibility and need not reach merits	Gravatt: district court erred; he is eligible and the court must exercise discretion on merits	Government: district court correctly found ineligible because statue supporting sentence unchanged	Court: vacated — district court should have considered the motion on the merits under §§404(b) and (c); remand for discretionary review

Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (describing Fair Sentencing Act reductions to crack sentencing thresholds)
United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2019) (interpreting §404(a) and holding defendants convicted under amended §841 provisions are eligible to move)
United States v. Venable, 943 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2019) (applying Wirsing to §404(a) covered-offense analysis)
United States v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act applies based on statute of conviction, not specific conduct)
United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2019) (same statutory-focus approach to "covered offense")
United States v. Beamus, 943 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2019) (per curiam adopting similar interpretation)
United States v. Charles, 932 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive)