United States v. Branden Pete
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6550
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- At 16, Navajo youth Branden (Brandon) Pete participated in the rape and beating-to-death of Charlotte Brown; he was tried as an adult, convicted of murder, and originally sentenced to mandatory life without parole under 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
- A 2003 forensic psychiatric evaluation (Dr. Rosenzweig) assessed Pete’s background, substance abuse, learning delays, and potential for rehabilitation; the district court later discounted portions of that evaluation in transfer proceedings.
- After Miller v. Alabama (2012) held mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional, Pete obtained resentencing on an open record and requested appointment of a neuropsychological expert under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) to develop mitigating, up-to-date evidence of maturity and rehabilitation.
- The district court denied funding for the expert, deeming a new evaluation duplicative of the 2003 report and ruling that incarceration-impact evidence was not the kind Miller contemplates; the court resentenced Pete to 708 months (59 years).
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit majority held the district court abused its discretion in refusing to appoint a neuropsychological expert because an updated evaluation was necessary to present Miller-based mitigating evidence and Pete was prejudiced by the denial; the sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing after appointment of an expert.
Issues
| Issue | Pete's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by denying CJA funds for a neuropsychologist under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) | An updated neuropsychological evaluation was necessary to show current maturity, rehabilitation prospects, and to rebut PSR/prison-record in light of Miller | A 2003 psychiatric evaluation already covered relevant factors; a new evaluation would be duplicative and incarceration-impact evidence is not central to Miller | Abuse of discretion: expert services were necessary because updated evaluation could produce Miller-relevant mitigating evidence and counter the government’s presentation |
| Whether denial of expert services prejudiced Pete at resentencing | Denial prevented development of evidence that could have changed the sentence (showing reduced dangerousness/rehabilitation) | Expert would not have altered outcome; trial court reasonably relied on conduct and PSR | Prejudice shown: Pete requested services in furtherance of a claim that, if meritorious, would have changed the outcome; remand required |
| Validity of Sentencing Guidelines base offense level 43 for murder | (challenged) Commission lacked authority to set level 43 as it yields no range | Level 43 aligns with statutory mandatory life under § 1111 and thus is consistent | Court rejected challenge; level 43 permissible and not reversible error |
| Criminal history calculation based on juvenile offenses in PSR | Objected to points for juvenile offenses; argued calculation was incorrect | PSR adjustments made; in any event Guidelines outcome unaffected | No prejudicial error demonstrated; even if mistaken, would not have changed outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencer must consider youth and attendant characteristics)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller rule is retroactive; juveniles must have meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity)
- Rodriguez-Lara v. United States, 421 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2005) (standards for CJA-funded expert services; abuse-of-discretion review requires showing necessity and prejudice)
- United States v. Hernandez, 604 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2010) (at resentencing court should consider changes over time including maturation, rehabilitation, and intervening law)
- Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) (at resentencing, court may consider evidence of defendant’s rehabilitation since prior sentence)
- Hartfield v. United States, 513 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendant need not prove expert would have reached a particular conclusion to show prejudice from denial of expert services)