United States v. Bonilla-Romero, 984 F.3d 414

At 17, Jose Leonel Bonilla‑Romero (a gang member) participated in a brutal murder (bat and machete). He was tried as an adult for first‑degree murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b).
The government transferred juvenile proceedings to adult court; Bonilla‑Romero ultimately pleaded guilty to first‑degree murder after an earlier rejected plea agreement.
At plea colloquy the district court explained that, because of Miller and Roper, the death penalty and mandatory life without parole were unavailable and that the court would sever the unconstitutional language, leaving punishment “for any term of years or for life.”
The PSR initially treated life as the Guidelines range; after a sentencing variance the district court imposed 460 months’ imprisonment plus five years supervised release.
On appeal Bonilla‑Romero raised two challenges: (1) the district court unconstitutionally fashioned a new punishment (notice and separation‑of‑powers concerns); and (2) the court failed to specify his potential sentencing range at the plea hearing in violation of Rule 11 and due process.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed: it upheld the district court’s severance/construction of § 1111(b) and found the plea colloquy adequately informed Bonilla‑Romero of the applicable maximum penalty.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court unlawfully "fashioned" a new punishment by severing § 1111(b) for juveniles	The United States: severing the unconstitutional death/mandatory‑life provisions leaves a valid statutory maximum of life; the court may impose any term up to life consistent with Congress’ intent	Bonilla‑Romero: severance or grafting a lesser penalty violates notice and separation of powers; Evans/Under Seal forbid retroactively applying a different penalty or grafting penalties	Court: affirmed severance; excising the unconstitutional minima leaves a maximum of life (or equivalently adopting second‑degree punishment). Remedy is severable, functions independently, and provides fair notice
Whether the plea colloquy failed to inform defendant of the applicable sentencing range (Rule 11, due process)	The United States: the court properly informed Bonilla‑Romero that death and mandatory life were inapplicable and that the penalty would be up to life (no mandatory minimum), satisfying Rule 11 notice requirements	Bonilla‑Romero: the court did not specify his potential sentencing range at the plea hearing, rendering the plea unknowing/invalid	Court: the plea colloquy adequately advised him of the maximum and absence of mandatory minimum; plea was knowing and voluntary

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles)
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (presumption in favor of severing unconstitutional statutory provisions)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (framework for retaining severable statutory parts)
United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (limits on importing penalties across statutory gaps)
United States v. Under Seal, 819 F.3d 715 (refusing to graft a distinct statute’s penalty onto another offense)
United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111 (sentencing discretion where Congress provides no maximum)
United States v. Wright, 812 F.3d 27 (same principle on sentencing discretion)
United States v. Pearson, 910 F.2d 221 (Rule 11 requires advising defendant of maximum and any mandatory minimum)