United States v. Bobby Banks, 960 F.3d 982

Background

In 2006 Banks was convicted by jury of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base; the district court originally sentenced him to 55 years (guideline life range), judgment affirmed on appeal.
The Fair Sentencing Act (2010) reduced penalties for certain crack offenses; the First Step Act (2018) permits resentencing for predicate offenses whose statutory penalties changed.
The district court found Banks eligible for First Step Act relief because his statute of conviction covered a 50‑gram threshold that the Fair Sentencing Act modified, and it recalculated an advisory Guidelines range of 360–480 months.
The court resentenced Banks to 480 months (40 years), down from 55 years, citing aggravating factors: long‑standing gang leadership, multiple death threats (to witnesses, a detective and family, and a BOP staff member), absconding on pretrial release, and witness‑tampering; it also found his Guidelines criminal‑history points understated his record.
Banks argued for a greater reduction based on post‑sentencing rehabilitation, difficult childhood, and sentencing disparity; the government cross‑appealed, arguing Banks was ineligible because he was accountable for 2.8 kg of crack.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed: it deemed Banks eligible (following United States v. McDonald), and held the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 480‑month sentence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Banks)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Eligibility under the First Step Act	Banks: statute of conviction (50 g) was covered by Fair Sentencing Act so he is eligible for resentencing	Gov: Banks should be ineligible because court attributed 2.8 kg of crack to him	Held: Eligible — First Step Act applies to the statute of conviction, not to underlying conduct (McDonald controls)
Effect of drug‑quantity attribution on eligibility	Banks: eligibility depends on statute of conviction, not higher attributable quantity	Gov: higher attributable quantity (2.8 kg) means penalties unchanged, so no relief	Held: Rejected government; quantity attribution does not defeat eligibility when statute convicted is within FSA scope
Whether district court abused discretion by not granting a greater reduction (rehabilitation, childhood, disparity)	Banks: court should have given more credit for post‑sentencing rehabilitation, mitigation, and sentencing disparities	Gov: district court properly weighed aggravating factors and was not required to grant further reduction	Held: No abuse of discretion — court permissibly declined further reduction after weighing aggravating facts; implicit consideration of mitigation sufficed
Need for hearing or explicit response to mitigation evidence	Banks: court erred by not specifically addressing rehabilitation evidence or holding a hearing	Gov: hearing not required; court may resolve on papers and need not reply to every argument	Held: No error — hearing not required; court presumed to consider arguments and need not explicitly respond to every point

Key Cases Cited

United States v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act eligibility determined by statute of conviction, not conduct)
United States v. Williams, 943 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2019) (district court may resolve First Step Act motions without a hearing; rehabilitation is not a required basis for reduction)
United States v. Gray, 533 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2008) (not every reasonable argument requires a specific judicial reply)
United States v. Timberlake, 679 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2012) (appellate presumption that district court considered arguments raised by defendant)
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (a within‑Guidelines sentence may not require extended explanation)
United States v. Banks, 494 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming Banks’s original conviction and sentence)