United States v. Bobbie Keys
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14512
| 8th Cir. | 2013Background
- Two cooperating sources (Kilcoin and Mitchell) told police that Bobbie Keys (identified by photo and address) supplied large quantities of crack cocaine at 2701 N. Early St., Kansas City, KS; one source described multiple trips and ounce- to kilogram‑level sales.
- Recorded, controlled phone calls between Kilcoin and Keys were used by detectives; detectives summarized the calls as discussing purchase of four ounces of “crack.”
- Police verified independent details (Keys’s driver license address, utilities, presence at the residence, and a blue Pontiac Firebird in the driveway) and executed a search warrant about 90 minutes after the final call.
- Search yielded drug paraphernalia and crack residue (scales, Pyrex cup with residue, baggies, razor, inositol) but no bulk quantity of crack.
- Keys moved to suppress and requested a Franks hearing claiming the affidavit falsely characterized the calls as using the word “crack”; he was denied. At trial he testified he used, but did not distribute, crack and offered an alternative (innocent) interpretation of the calls.
- Jury convicted Keys of conspiracy to distribute ≥280 grams of crack; district court denied Rule 29 motions and motions to exclude testimony as Brady violations. Keys appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Request for Franks hearing / Motion to suppress | Quotation marks in affidavit around “crack” falsely implied that the word was spoken in calls; affidavit therefore contained false statements and misled issuing judge | Quotation marks merely indicated slang for cocaine and the affidavit—viewed as a whole—was corroborated by independent evidence, so suppression unnecessary | Denied: even excising the challenged language, the affidavit contained sufficient corroboration to establish probable cause; no substantial showing that the alleged falsehood was necessary to finding probable cause |
| Sufficiency of the evidence (Rule 29) | Evidence only showed Keys’s activity in Kansas City, not participation in a conspiracy "in" Nebraska; witnesses had incentives to lie; search found only residue, not distribution quantities | Indictment alleged conspiracy “in Nebraska and elsewhere”; venue and overt acts satisfied; witness testimony sufficient and jury credibility decisions control | Denied: viewing evidence in government’s favor, testimony established an agreement, Keys’s knowledge, and participation; jury could reasonably convict |
| Brady claim re: "new" trial testimony (Evans, Schaaf, Mitchell) | Government failed to disclose material impeachment/exculpatory evidence before trial by not revealing new details from these witnesses | Testimony was inculpatory; defendant had full opportunity to impeach witnesses at trial; lack of pretrial disclosure did not prejudice the defense | Denied: no Brady violation—evidence was not exculpatory and defendant effectively impeached witnesses at trial; no reasonable probability of a different result |
| Venue / Indictment specificity (related argument) | Alleged conspiracy focused in Kansas City; indictment referenced Nebraska, so insufficient notice/venue issue | Indictment charged conspiracy in Nebraska and elsewhere; acts in Nebraska by cooperators suffice for venue; defendant did not preserve venue objection | Rejected: indictment sufficed and venue proper; defendant failed to show error |
Key Cases Cited
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (court may order hearing if defendant makes substantial preliminary showing of falsehood in affidavit)
- United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2013) (totality-of-circumstances standard for probable cause)
- United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 1993) (corroboration of informant information supports reliability)
- United States v. Gabrio, 295 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2002) (Franks standard: false statement must be necessary to probable cause)
- United States v. Jackson, 898 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1990) (mutually corroborative tips may support probable cause)
- United States v. May, 476 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard of review for sufficiency of evidence)
- United States v. Jiminez, 487 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 2007) (elements of §846 conspiracy)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (materiality standard for Brady disclosure)
- United States v. Livingstone, 576 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2009) (Brady includes impeachment evidence and need only be disclosed in time for effective use)