605 F.Supp.3d 111
D.D.C.2022Background
- On Jan. 6, 2021 defendants Sturgeon, Bingert, and Johnatakis are alleged to have been at the Capitol and, with others, rammed a metal barricade into a line of police officers; each was charged in a superseding indictment with eight counts related to the breach.
- Relevant counts challenged on pretrial motion: Count One (18 U.S.C. §1512(c)(2) — obstruction of an official proceeding), Count Three (18 U.S.C. §231(a)(3) — obstructing officers during a civil disorder), Counts Four–Six (18 U.S.C. §1752(a)(1) — entering/remaining in restricted grounds).
- Defendants moved to dismiss arguing (inter alia) that the Electoral College certification was not an "official proceeding," §1512(c)(2) and §231(a)(3) are unconstitutionally vague, §1752(a)(1) is an unconstitutional as-applied restriction on First Amendment activity, and only the Secret Service (not Capitol Police) may designate restricted areas / Pence was not a "temporary visitor."
- The government opposed; the Court accepted the indictment's factual allegations for the Rule 12(b) motion and analyzed statutory text, context, vagueness doctrine, and First Amendment as‑applied principles.
- The Court denied the motion to dismiss in full, holding that the certification was an "official proceeding," §1512(c)(2) and §231(a)(3) are not unconstitutionally vague, §1512(c)(2) is not limited to acts involving objects mentioned in subsection (c)(1), §1752(a)(1) is constitutional as applied, and the Capitol Police properly restricted the area while the Vice President was "temporarily visiting."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Congress's Electoral College certification is an "official proceeding" under §1512(c)(2) | Government: statutory definition of "official proceeding" includes "a proceeding before Congress" so certification qualifies | Defendants: "proceeding" must be adjudicative or quasi‑adjudicative (witnesses, documentary evidence), certification is only ceremonial/administrative | Court: "proceeding before Congress" covers the formal, assembled congressional certification; certification is an official proceeding and §1512(c)(2) applies |
| Whether §1512(c)(2) is unconstitutionally vague (esp. meaning of "corruptly" and "official proceeding") | Gov't: "corruptly" has settled meanings from Supreme Court and later statutes and requires consciousness of wrongdoing / improper purpose and intent to obstruct | Defs.: "corruptly" and "official proceeding" are indefinite and invite arbitrary enforcement; Poindexter signals vagueness problems | Court: statute is not vague — Poindexter limited to §1505; Arthur Andersen and later precedent supply a limiting mens rea (consciousness of wrongdoing/improper purpose); "official proceeding" has been reasonably defined by courts |
| Whether §1512(c)(2) is limited by §1512(c)(1) (i.e., "otherwise" means only acts similar to altering/destroying objects) | Defs.: "otherwise" makes (c)(2) a residual limited to acts like those listed in (c)(1) | Gov't: ordinary meaning of "otherwise" = "in a different way" supports a broad catch‑all; text/context show Congress intended broader coverage | Court: adopted ordinary meaning; (c)(2) is a broad, independent catch‑all that criminalizes corrupt obstruction of an official proceeding beyond the specific acts in (c)(1) |
| Whether 18 U.S.C. §231(a)(3) is unconstitutionally vague | Defs.: statute lacks scienter, uses subjective standards, and gives inadequate notice | Gov't: statute requires intent to obstruct/impede officers during a defined "civil disorder" and therefore supplies sufficient mens rea and objective bounds | Court: §231(a)(3) is not vague — it requires specific intent to obstruct and "civil disorder" is defined; ordinary people can understand the proscribed conduct |
| Whether §1752(a)(1) is unconstitutional as‑applied under the First Amendment; and whether only Secret Service may designate restricted areas / whether VP was a "temporary visitor" | Defs.: §1752(a)(1) impermissibly restricts expressive activity here; restricted‑area designation invalid because Secret Service did not do it; Pence was not "temporarily visiting" the Capitol | Gov't: alleged conduct (violent push with barricade, assault on officers) is not protected expressive conduct; statute permits designation by local authorities; Pence was temporarily present for the joint session | Court: as‑applied First Amendment challenge fails because the alleged conduct was violent and nonexpressive; Capitol Police restriction was valid; Pence was "temporarily visiting," so §§1752(4–6) counts properly state offenses |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (D.C. Circuit found "corruptly" in §1505 vague in context of that statute)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (Supreme Court construed "corruptly" and related mens rea in obstruction statute)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (Supreme Court interpreted the scope of a residual clause introduced by "otherwise")
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (vagueness doctrine: statutes invalid if they fail to give fair notice or invite arbitrary enforcement)
- Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (textualist canon: enforce ordinary meaning when statutory language is clear)
- O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (test for when conduct is protected expression)
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (First Amendment limits do not protect violent or disorderly demonstrations)