United States v. Bey
825 F.3d 75
1st Cir.2016Background
- Police sought Bey on an arrest warrant related to a domestic-violence incident; Bey was believed to be at Clarissa Summons’s Everett residence, where he violated a restraining order.
- Officers knocked, Summons signaled Bey’s presence and allowed entry; police entered with weapons drawn and found Bey in a bedroom.
- A heavy backpack near Bey prompted a search; Bey indicated the backpack belonged to Summons.
- Consent to search Summons’s home followed a front-door exchange; a search of the backpack yielded a handgun, drugs, a scale, and oxycodone.
- Bey moved to suppress the evidence; district court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing; Bey pled guilty to six counts.
- Plea agreement preserved Bey’s right to challenge the suppression ruling but waived appellate rights to appeal the conviction or sentence unless over seventy months; district court sentenced Bey to sixty months.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Summons validly consented to the search of her home | Be y argues consent was coerced by police tactics | Summons’s free will was overwhelmed; consent invalid | Consent valid; search upheld |
| Whether Summons’s consent to search the backpack was voluntary | Consent to backpack search was coerced by DCF threats | Sign-off on consent form was the product of implied coercion | Consent voluntary; backpack search allowed |
| Whether the backpack search was authorized by common authority | Summons had shared control over the backpack | Bey’s argument about lack of common authority should prevail | Search valid under common authority doctrine |
| Whether the appellate-waiver clause forecloses Bey’s challenge after Johnson II | Waiver bars appeal regardless of Johnson II | Miscarriage-of-justice exception could permit review | Waiver enforced; no miscarriage of justice found |
| Whether the armed career offender enhancement affected sentencing after Johnson II | Guidelines calculation overstated due to Johnson II | Waiver forecloses appeal; sentence stance stands | Waiver enforceable; guideline calculation ultimately affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Matlock, 415 F.2d 164 (U.S. 1974) (consent of jointly authorized third party valid against others)
- United States v. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (consent requires voluntariness under totality of circumstances)
- United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2008) (not inherently coercive conduct; less-than-robust coercion supports voluntariness)
- United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (U.S. 1976) (no coercion where police actions at entry were non-threatening)
- Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (U.S. 1963) (police threats regarding child welfare can render statements involuntary)
- United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001) (presumption of waiver subject to strict criteria)
- United States v. Miliano, 480 F.3d 605 (1st Cir. 2007) (appellate waivers are presumptively valid but reviewed for miscarriage of justice)
- Sotirion v. United States, 617 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2010) (miscarriage-of-justice exception to waivers requires egregious error)
- Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (voiding residual clause of ACCA; affects sentencing calculations)