792 F.3d 837
7th Cir.2015Background
- In 2002 Ribota was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of firearms; a $50,000 bond was posted and he was released under conditions to report to Pretrial Services and remain within the Northern District of Illinois.
- Ribota violated those conditions, a bench warrant issued after he failed to appear, and he eluded arrest for over nine years until apprehended in 2012.
- In 2013 Ribota moved to suppress evidence from the 2002 search; the prosecutor agreed the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment and the district court granted the suppression and the government then moved to dismiss the drug/firearm indictment.
- The day after the suppression ruling, the government charged Ribota with two counts of criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) for willfully failing to report to Pretrial Services and violating travel restrictions.
- Ribota moved to dismiss the contempt indictment as prosecutorially vindictive retaliation for his successful suppression motion; the district court denied the motion and Ribota appealed.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) no presumption of vindictiveness applied in the pretrial context and (2) Ribota offered no objective evidence of actual vindictiveness beyond timing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the contempt prosecution is unconstitutional vindictiveness | Ribota: prosecution was solely to punish him for winning suppression and dismissing the drug case | Government: prosecutorial charging decisions are discretionary; contempt charge addressed separate criminal conduct and was timely | Court: No presumption of vindictiveness; timing alone insufficient — indictment upheld |
| Whether a presumption of vindictiveness arises in pretrial charging changes | Ribota: presumption should apply because charge followed successful pretrial motion | Government: presumption is inappropriate pretrial; prosecutor still assessing charges | Court: Presumption does not apply pretrial; only applies in limited retrial/appeal contexts |
| Whether the contempt charge concerns the same conduct as the suppressed charges | Ribota: implied that contempt was related to original case vindictively | Government: contempt involves distinct conduct (absconding/violating bond conditions) | Court: Contempt was independent conduct; different-charges context undermines presumption |
| Whether timing of charge alone constitutes objective evidence of vindictiveness | Ribota: charged the day after suppression — suspicious timing | Government: timing was reasonable because defendant would soon be released and contempt related to prolonged absconding | Court: Suspicious timing alone insufficient; no other objective evidence of animus; charge permitted |
Key Cases Cited
- Goodwin v. United States, 457 U.S. 368 (U.S. 1982) (framework for prosecutorial vindictiveness claims; presumption limited to certain contexts)
- Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (U.S. 1978) (prosecutorial charging discretion and its breadth)
- United States v. Scott, 631 F.3d 401 (7th Cir. 2011) (deference to prosecutorial charging decisions)
- Williams v. Bartow, 481 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2007) (limits on presumption of vindictiveness and distinction when charges involve different conduct)
- United States v. Bullis, 77 F.3d 1553 (7th Cir. 1996) (burden-shifting when presumption or objective evidence of vindictiveness shown)
- United States v. Falcon, 347 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2003) (requirement of objective evidence of prosecutorial animus)
- United States v. Jarrett, 447 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 2006) (prosecutorial discretion and pretrial-charging context)
- United States v. Pittman, 642 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2011) (timing alone does not establish vindictiveness)
- United States v. Ladeau, 734 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing substitution of charges for same conduct from charges for different conduct)
