United States v. Benjamin Stanley, Rufus Paul Harris
739 F.3d 633
11th Cir.2014Background
- Defendants Rufus Harris (CEO) and Benjamin Stanley (COO) were tried for a pump-and-dump securities fraud involving false SEC filings and press releases that inflated CSHC stock, causing thousands of investors to lose millions.
- Harris initially had court-appointed counsel (Manchel), then mid-trial (after opening statements) invoked his right to proceed pro se; the court allowed self-representation and appointed Manchel as standby counsel after a colloquy.
- Harris vigorously participated pro se during the Government’s case but absconded after the Government rested; he was later captured and convicted on all counts; Stanley was convicted on several counts and acquitted on others.
- After Harris fled, the district court refused to allow standby counsel to take over Harris’s defense, denied co-defendant Stanley’s motion for severance/mistrial but gave a limiting instruction that Harris’s flight could only be considered against Harris, not Stanley or Horton.
- At sentencing the court considered Harris’s allocution (continued denials of wrongdoing) and sentenced Harris and Stanley to substantial terms; Stanley’s request for a minor-role Guidelines reduction was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of Harris’s Faretta waiver | Harris: waiver was invalid because initial colloquy was insufficient and later diagnosis undermines competence | Government: waiver was knowing, intelligent, voluntary; subsequent colloquy and trial conduct cure any defect | Waiver valid: whole record (second colloquy, trial performance, standby counsel aid) shows knowing, intelligent, voluntary waiver |
| Whether standby counsel must represent Harris after he fled | Harris: court should have allowed Manchel to represent the absent Harris | Government: Harris knowingly waived counsel; flight did not revoke waiver and trial could not proceed "in like manner" with absent pro se defendant | No Sixth Amendment violation: court permissibly refused to appoint counsel over Harris’s prior Faretta waiver |
| Severance/mistrial for Stanley after Harris’s flight | Stanley: Harris’s flight tainted joint trial and his good-faith defense; mistrial/severance required | Government: limiting instruction and jury’s individualized verdict mitigate prejudice; severance unnecessary | No abuse of discretion: curative instruction was adequate; jury treated defendants separately as shown by mixed verdicts |
| Sentencing: use of allocution/lack of remorse and minor-role reduction | Harris: court impermissibly penalized him for invoking Fifth Amendment; Stanley: was entitled to minor-role reduction and his sentence was substantively unreasonable | Government: court may consider voluntary statements of remorse (or lack thereof); record shows Stanley was substantially involved and sentence was reasonable | Court properly considered Harris’s voluntary allocution; denial of minor-role reduction not clearly erroneous; Stanley’s below-Guidelines sentence was reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to self-representation requires a knowing and voluntary waiver)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (limits on standby counsel participation to preserve pro se control)
- Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973) (trial may not proceed "in like manner" when defendant absent)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (standard for reviewing sentence reasonableness)
- United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (framework for assessing role-in-offense adjustments)
- United States v. Cash, 47 F.3d 1083 (11th Cir. 1995) (waiver analysis and effect of mental-health findings)
- Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1986) (multi-factor test for Faretta waiver validity)
- Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (binding precedent from former Fifth Circuit adopted by Eleventh Circuit)