United States v. Benjamin Galecki
932 F.3d 176
| 4th Cir. | 2019Background
- Galecki and Ritchie operated Zencense Incenseworks, selling “spice” containing synthetic cannabinoids (XLR-11/UR-144) labeled “Not for human consumption.”
- Government charged them (2012–2013 conduct) under the Analogue Act and related statutes, alleging XLR-11 was substantially similar to JWH-018 and defendants knew that similarity.
- At second trial jury convicted after an Allen charge; defendants appealed arguing, inter alia, denial of compulsory process to compel DEA chemist Dr. Arthur Berrier and several evidentiary exclusions.
- This Court previously vacated convictions and remanded for the district court to determine materiality of Berrier’s testimony; district court found his testimony not material as merely cumulative and declined to compel him.
- On further appeal the Fourth Circuit held Berrier’s testimony was material (unique because he was an uncompensated DEA scientist and could rebut DEA processes), reversed and vacated the convictions, and remanded for new trial.
- The Court also affirmed exclusion of DEA Agent Cosey’s testimony as irrelevant, but vacated exclusion of attorney McGee’s and defendant Ritchie’s testimony to the extent they bear on defendants’ state of mind and remanded for limited development.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether exclusion of DEA chemist Dr. Berrier violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment compulsory process right (materiality) | Gov't: Berrier's opinion was cumulative to defense experts and not material | Ritchie/Galecki: Berrier’s DEA role and dissenting opinion were uniquely non-pecuniary and could materially affect verdict | Reversed: Berrier’s testimony was material (not merely cumulative); exclusion was unconstitutional and not harmless; convictions vacated and case remanded for retrial |
| Admissibility of DEA Agent Claude Cosey’s statements to show innocent intent / entrapment-by-estoppel | Gov't: Cosey’s statements were non-committal and post-dated relevant conduct; irrelevant | Ritchie/Galecki: Cosey’s remarks showed law-enforcement reassurances that could negate mens rea | Affirmed exclusion: Cosey’s comments did not affirm legality nor speak to chemical similarity on the charged date; irrelevant and harmless |
| Admissibility of attorney David McGee’s testimony about chemists’ opinions (to show defendants’ state of mind on Aug 9, 2012) | Gov't: Testimony was hearsay and irrelevant because consultations occurred after defendants began selling XLR-11 | Ritchie/Galecki: McGee relayed chemists’ opinions that defendants relied on, which could negate knowledge of substantial similarity | Vacated exclusion: Remanded to develop timing/content of McGee’s consultations; if timely, his testimony admissible limited to effect on defendants’ state of mind (not for truth) |
| Admissibility of defendant Ritchie’s testimony about reliance on counsel/chemists (state of mind) | Gov't: Ritchie’s testimony impermissibly tries to backdoor affirmative defenses and may be hearsay | Ritchie/Galecki: Ritchie can testify to his own state of mind and reliance which negates mens rea | Vacated exclusion in part: Ritchie may testify as to his own state of mind; testimony about others’ statements contingent on permissible McGee foundation and offered only for effect on state of mind |
Key Cases Cited
- McFadden v. United States, 823 F.3d 217 (4th Cir.) (explains methods to prove knowledge under Analogue Act)
- Valenzuela-Bernal v. United States, 458 U.S. 858 (establishes materiality components for compulsory process claims)
- Rhynes v. Weber, 218 F.3d 310 (4th Cir.) (harmlessness and prejudice analysis for constitutional errors)
- Moussaoui v. United States, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir.) (approach to reviewing materiality and remand practice)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (harmless-error standard for constitutional trial errors)