United States v. Benally, 19 F.4th 1250

Background

On March 5, 2019 Angelita Benally, driving intoxicated on I‑40 within the Acoma Pueblo Reservation, crashed head‑on into J.G.’s car; her front‑seat passenger L.C. died and J.G. suffered serious injuries.
A federal indictment charged Benally with involuntary manslaughter in Indian Country (Count 1) and assault resulting in serious bodily injury (Count 2).
Benally pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter; the government dismissed the assault charge. The written plea agreement stated the parties would seek restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), invoking §3663A(c)(2) on the basis that a §3663A(c)(1) offense (the assault count) gave rise to the plea.
At sentencing the district court ordered restitution under the MVRA to L.C.’s family and to J.G.; Benally objected that J.G. was not a victim of the offense of conviction.
After the Supreme Court decided Borden v. United States (holding reckless mens rea does not qualify as a “violent felony”), Benally argued on appeal that MVRA did not apply and restitution should be discretionary under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA); she sought reversal of restitution awarded to J.G.
The Tenth Circuit held the district court erred in applying the MVRA post‑Borden but denied plain‑error relief, concluding the same victim‑analysis would apply under the VWPA and Benally’s substantial rights were not affected; the judgment was affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (United States)	Defendant's Argument (Benally)	Held
Whether the district court had authority to order restitution under the MVRA after Borden	MVRA applied because plea agreement invoked §3663A(c)(2) tying restitution to the dismissed assault count	Borden removed the assault predicate as a §16/“crime of violence,” so MVRA did not apply and restitution could only be discretionary under the VWPA	District court erred to apply MVRA post‑Borden, but error was plain and did not warrant reversal under plain‑error review
Whether J.G. qualified as a “victim” of the offense of conviction for restitution purposes	J.G. was directly and proximately harmed by the same conduct that gave rise to the manslaughter conviction	Only L.C.’s death was the legally cognizable loss of the manslaughter conviction; J.G. was not a victim of that offense	J.G. was a victim: the admitted conduct (head‑on crash) caused both L.C.’s death and J.G.’s injuries/vehicle loss, so restitution to J.G. was permissible
Whether failing to apply VWPA’s mandatory consideration of defendant’s financial circumstances affected substantial rights	The PSR and sentencing record adequately presented Benally’s finances; the court knew her ability to pay	VWPA requires explicit consideration of the defendant’s finances and a remand is needed because MVRA was applied instead	No substantial‑rights harm: the record reflected Benally’s financial situation and she agreed in the plea that restitution would be ordered
Whether remand was required so the district court could exercise discretion under the VWPA	No remand necessary because the victim analysis and likely restitution outcome would be the same under VWPA	Remand required to permit exercise of VWPA discretion and fresh consideration of amount and ability to pay	No remand; affirmation because VWPA and MVRA employ the same victim/causation analysis and the record supported the restitution award

Key Cases Cited

Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) (recklessness does not qualify as an element of “violent felony”/crime of violence)
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990) (VWPA authorizes restitution for loss caused by the specific conduct underlying the offense of conviction)
Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021) (Rule 52(b) plain‑error standard applies to forfeited claims on appeal)
Rosales‑Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897 (2018) (explaining the ‘‘substantial rights’’ prong of plain‑error review)
United States v. Anthony, 942 F.3d 955 (10th Cir. 2019) (MVRA and VWPA use same causation standard)
United States v. Mann, 899 F.3d 898 (10th Cir. 2018) (assault resulting in serious bodily injury can be committed with reckless mens rea)
United States v. Mendenhall, 945 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2019) (applying Hughey rationale to MVRA)
United States v. Checora, 175 F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1999) (VWPA restitution to manslaughter victim’s family for loss of financial support)
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997) (error need only be plain at time of appellate consideration)
United States v. Brewer, 983 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1993) (restitution limited to losses caused by conduct underlying the offense of conviction)