712 F.3d 111
2d Cir.2013Background
- Barton was charged with narcotics conspiracy, meth manufacture, possession with intent to distribute, and firearms charges; Smith sought to withdraw as counsel after Barton refused to communicate.
- Barton repeatedly declined to complete a financial affidavit and stated he did not want appointed counsel, while claiming funds to hire private counsel.
- District court initially appointed Smith after Barton failed to participate and after concerns about competence; Judge Payson later described the appointment as based on Barton not declaring an attorney.
- Barton insisted he wanted private counsel and that Smith was not his attorney; he did not complete a CJA financial eligibility form for appointment of counsel.
- The district court ultimately denied Smith’s motion to withdraw, and Barton faced warnings that he could be required to proceed pro se if he did not obtain counsel or apply for appointment.
- Smith appealed, arguing the appointment and continued representation were improper; the district court had not properly established financial eligibility or a valid appointment authority.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the denial of withdrawal was abuse of discretion | Smith asserts improper appointment from outset; Barton refused to recognize Smith and refused financial aid eligibility. | Barton resisted appointment and preferred private counsel; representation by Smith was proper due to lack of self-representation clarity. | Abuse of discretion; improper initial appointment invalidating continued representation |
| Whether the CJA requires an explicit financial-eligibility finding before appointment | District court failed to determine eligibility and forced appointment without proper inquiry. | Barton declined to submit a financial affidavit but indicated ability to hire private counsel; no eligibility finding was made because not needed. | District court abused discretion; no valid appointment without inquiry into eligibility |
| Whether Barton validly waived the right to counsel by his conduct | Court should treat ongoing refusal to cooperate as waiver and allow fallback to pro se if necessary. | Barton did not knowingly and intelligently waive; he expressed preference for private counsel and avoidance of Smith. | Court could not force continued representation by an unwilling attorney for an unwilling defendant |
| Whether the district court could require Smith to continue representing Barton after improper appointment | Termination of appointment would be inappropriate given the circumstances of appointment. | Because appointment was improper, Smith should not be required to continue representing Barton. | Reversed; improper appointment and lack of consent render continued representation unwarranted |
Key Cases Cited
- O'Connor v. United States, 650 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 2011) (review of withdrawal for abuse of discretion after proper appointment)
- Oberoi v. United States, 331 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2003) (limits on forcing representation; professional responsibility considerations)
- Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1999) (collateral order doctrine for attorney withdrawal orders)
- Parker v. United States, 439 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2006) (adequacy and manner of financial inquiry for appointment of counsel)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (voluntary and unequivocal waiver of counsel required for self-representation)
- Williams v. Bartlett, 44 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1994) (forgo benefits of counsel must be voluntary and intelligent)
- McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1981) (court may require choosing between waiver and other representation course)
- Gravatt v. 868 F.2d 585, 868 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1989) (district court cannot condition appointment solely on financial affidavit)
- Moore v. United States, 671 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1982) (abuse of discretion when court improperly demands financial affidavit before consideration)