United States v. Barry Bonds
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6708
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- Barry Bonds, then a professional baseball player, testified before a grand jury investigating steroid distribution (BALCO). He had been granted use-and-derivative-immunity for compelled testimony.
- During nearly three hours of questioning, Bonds gave a rambling, non-responsive answer ("Statement C") to a direct question about whether his trainer Greg Anderson had given him injectable substances.
- The government charged Bonds with four counts of making false statements and one count of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503; the jury convicted on the obstruction count only.
- The obstruction count alleged Bonds knowingly gave material, intentionally evasive, false, or misleading grand-jury testimony that corrupted the investigation.
- On appeal (en banc), the court addressed whether a single non-responsive answer to a grand-jury question can be the basis for a § 1503 conviction and whether the evidence established materiality.
- The per curiam court reversed the obstruction conviction, holding the record lacked sufficient evidence that Statement C was material to the grand-jury investigation; several concurring and dissenting opinions elaborated different limits and interpretations of § 1503.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a single non-responsive grand-jury answer can support a § 1503 obstruction conviction | Gov: An evasive answer can be prosecuted under § 1503 if it was intended to and capable of impeding the grand-jury investigation | Bonds: A single non-responsive (and here non-material) answer cannot satisfy § 1503’s materiality requirement | Reversed: A lone non-responsive statement (Statement C) was not shown to be material and cannot sustain the § 1503 conviction |
| Proper materiality standard for § 1503 prosecutions | Gov: Materiality requires capability to influence the decisionmaking body; context matters | Defense: Bronston/Aguilar principles require that a single evasive but truthful answer cannot be treated as obstructive; prosecutor must pin down evasive testimony | Court: Materiality is required; here the answer had no capacity to influence the grand jury and thus was immaterial |
| Whether Bronston’s literal-truth rule and prosecutor’s duty to follow up bar obstruction prosecutions for evasive answers | Gov: Not dispositive for obstruction; evasive testimony can obstruct even if literally true | Bonds: Bronston places the burden on the questioner to clarify; single evasive truthful answers should not be criminalized | Concurring opinions: Several judges relied on Bronston/Aguilar to limit § 1503 application here; court found follow-up occurred and Statement C remained non-material |
| Scope of § 1503 re in-court testimony and meaning of “corruptly” | Gov: § 1503 reaches corruptly intended statements that impede justice | Some concurrences: Statute should be cabined (materiality, Bronston); others argue “corruptly” means bribery and § 1503 shouldn’t reach ordinary in-court testimony | No majority ruling expanding/restricting statute beyond this record; per curiam limited decision to insufficiency for Statement C (several concurrences urged broader readings) |
Key Cases Cited
- Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) (literal-truth doctrine and duty of questioner to obtain responsive testimony)
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (materiality: endeavor must have natural and probable effect of interfering with due administration of justice)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency review: whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt)
- United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981) (§ 1503 designed to proscribe corrupt methods of obstructing justice)
- United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (application of § 1503 to in-court/grand-jury false statements and materiality analysis)
- United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1979) (evasive testimony may be material when it amounts to a refusal to testify)
- United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2003) (materiality assessed by capability to affect decisionmaking process)