United States v. Barry Bonds
730 F.3d 890
9th Cir.2013Background
- Barry Bonds testified before a grand jury in December 2003 under a grant of use and derivative-use immunity about whether his trainer, Greg Anderson, supplied him injectable steroids/PEDs.
- In response to a question whether Anderson ever gave him anything requiring a syringe, Bonds replied with a nonresponsive, factually true statement about being a "celebrity child," later answering directly that Anderson "wouldn’t" give him such injections.
- The government indicted Bonds for multiple false-statement counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 and for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 based on allegedly evasive, misleading, or false grand jury testimony ("Statement C" forming the basis for the obstruction count).
- After trial, the jury convicted Bonds of obstruction (finding Statement C evasive/misleading) but deadlocked on remaining false-statement counts; Bonds was sentenced to 30 days home confinement and two years probation.
- Bonds appealed raising five principal challenges: scope of § 1503 vis-à-vis misleading but factually true statements; applicability of § 1503 to grand jury testimony; vagueness of the term "corruptly"; sufficiency of the indictment; and proposed jury-instruction language.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bonds) | Defendant's Argument (U.S.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1503 applies to factually true but evasive/misleading statements | § 1503 requires falsity; a literally true statement cannot be obstruction | § 1503 covers conduct intended to obstruct, including evasive or misleading truthful testimony | Courts hold § 1503 covers factually true but intentionally evasive/misleading testimony; conviction affirmed |
| Sufficiency of evidence that Statement C was evasive, misleading, and material | Statement C was true ("celebrity child") and unrelated to the question, so not obstructive or material | Statement C diverted the grand jury, was misleading given other testimony, and had tendency to influence the investigation | Sufficient evidence supported that Statement C was intentionally evasive/misleading and material; review under Jackson v. Virginia supports conviction |
| Whether § 1503 applies to grand jury testimony | § 1503 does not reach witness testimony before the grand jury | Omnibus clause is broad and has long been applied to in-court and grand-jury testimony | Precedent holds § 1503 applies to grand-jury testimony; Bonds’s claim rejected |
| Vagueness of the mens rea term "corruptly" in § 1503 | "Corruptly" is unconstitutionally vague as used in § 1503 | "Corruptly" requires purposeful obstruction; courts have rejected vagueness challenges | Term is not unconstitutionally vague as applied; conviction stands |
| Indictment specificity and jury unanimity / jury instruction language | Indictment failed to quote Statement C and gave inadequate notice; instruction should require considering testimony "in its totality" | Indictment covered any material false, misleading, or evasive grand-jury testimony; instructions narrowed statements and required unanimity | Indictment was sufficient; proposed "totality" language unnecessary and potentially misleading; instructions proper |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981) (omnibus clause of § 1503 proscribes broad corrupt methods of obstructing justice; "corruptly" means purposeful obstruction)
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (omnibus clause is a catchall prohibiting endeavors to obstruct justice; false testimony to grand jury can violate § 1503)
- United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1979) (no material difference between evasive deliberate concealment and false answers for obstruction purposes)
- United States v. Remini, 967 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1992) (‘‘literally true but evasive and misleading testimony would support prosecution...for obstruction of justice")
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (Jackson standard for sufficiency of evidence: view evidence in light most favorable to jury verdict)
- United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (as-applied vagueness challenge to "corruptly" in § 1505; court cautioned against extending its reasoning to § 1503)
- Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (indictment sufficiency standard: must contain elements to inform defendant and protect against double jeopardy)