United States v. Barnes, 890 F.3d 910

Background

Raymond Barnes (jail superintendent) and Christopher Brown (assistant superintendent) were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to violate constitutional rights and deprivation of rights under color of law (18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242); Brown also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for a false statement.
Trial and record showed repeated, organized physical abuse of restrained inmates (“meet and greets”), other assaults, and efforts to intimidate staff and conceal misconduct.
On initial sentencing the district court imposed below-guidelines sentences (Barnes 12 months; Brown 6 months); this court vacated those sentences as procedurally unreasonable and remanded for resentencing.
On remand the district court held a hearing, considered § 3553(a) factors, and granted downward variances from a 70–87 month guidelines range, imposing 24 months for Barnes and 12 months for Brown (plus supervised release).
The government appealed again, arguing the resentences were substantively unreasonable; the Tenth Circuit majority affirmed, while a dissent argued the variances were unwarranted given national sentencing patterns and the seriousness of the offenses.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Government)	Defendant's Argument (Barnes/Brown)	Held
Whether the resentences were substantively unreasonable	Sentences are too lenient given severity, need for general deterrence, and nationwide sentencing patterns for §§ 241/242	District court properly weighed individualized § 3553(a) factors (health, family, lack of criminal history, low recidivism risk) to justify downward variances	Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion; explanation and individualized consideration of § 3553(a) factors sustain variances
Whether reliance on collateral consequences (loss of law‑enforcement careers) improperly supported variances	Such collateral consequences should not justify large downward variances and do not distinguish these defendants from others	District court permissibly considered these and related individualized impacts under § 3553(a) after Booker made Guidelines advisory	Rejected as a controlling procedural bar; majority permits consideration in a variance context when tied to § 3553(a) analysis
Whether the extent of the variance (≈66–83%) was arbitrary	The magnitude creates unwarranted disparities and undercuts general deterrence; comparable § 241/242 cases impose much harsher sentences	Magnitude is supportable by defendant‑specific facts and sentencing judge’s holistic § 3553(a) weighing	Affirmed: appellate deference required; record shows specific, permissible reasons for the variances
Whether district court improperly relied on factors already accounted for in the Guidelines	The government contends double‑counting undermines the variances	Defendants: court may consider facts already reflected in Guidelines when exercising sentencing discretion	Rejected: circuit precedent allows consideration of such facts in framing a variance under § 3553(a)

Key Cases Cited

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (appellate review framework for reasonableness of sentence; deference to district court’s § 3553(a) weighing)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Sentencing Guidelines rendered advisory; district courts may vary based on § 3553(a))
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (limits on considering collateral consequences in guideline departures; discussed distinction between departures and post‑Booker variances)
United States v. DeRusse, 859 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2017) (upholding substantial downward variance when district court properly weighed § 3553(a) factors)
United States v. Lente, 759 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2014) (district courts may consider facts already accounted for in Guidelines when varying)
United States v. Walker, 844 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2017) (reversal where district court relied nearly exclusively on a single factor to justify a large variance)
United States v. McQueen (Alexander), 727 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 2013) (example of a below‑guidelines sentence for § 241/242 reversed as substantively unreasonable; used in dissent to show national sentencing norms)