United States v. Baldwin, 745 F.3d 1027

Background

Charles Baldwin, a Department of Interior attorney, was stopped on Denver Federal Center grounds by Federal Protective Service Commander Kevin Lundy for speeding and swerving; Lundy began to issue a warning.
Baldwin drove off while Lundy was issuing the warning and allegedly ignored shouted orders to stop; Lundy followed off federal property and later handcuffed Baldwin after an interaction.
After a bench trial, Baldwin was convicted of (1) failing to comply with lawful direction of a federal police officer (41 C.F.R. § 102-74.385), (2) impeding/disrupting government employees (41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390(c)), and (3) attempting to obstruct a peace officer under Colorado law assimilated by 18 U.S.C. § 13.
Baldwin challenged (a) whether the cited regulations constitute criminal offenses, (b) vagueness/due process, (c) lack of mens rea in the regulations and insufficient evidence of knowledge, and (d) lack of posted notice required by statute — raising the posting issue for the first time on appeal.
The magistrate judge instructed the government to prove Baldwin acted knowingly; the trial court found that Baldwin heard the commands and intentionally drove off based on testimony and video evidence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed all convictions, finding the regulations may be criminally enforced under congressional delegation, the statutes/regulations gave Baldwin fair notice as applied, mens rea (knowingly) was properly read in and supported by the record, and the posting argument was forfeited (not plain error).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Do the regulations create criminal offenses?	Baldwin: headings show policies, not crimes.	Government: subpart provides explicit criminal penalties authorized by Congress.	Held: Regulations impose criminal penalties; Congress authorized agencies to promulgate such rules.
Are the regulations unconstitutionally vague as applied?	Baldwin: terms like “impede or disrupt” are vague and could criminalize innocuous conduct.	Government: vagueness challenge must be as-applied; Baldwin’s conduct (driving off while an officer warned) was clearly covered.	Held: No vagueness problem as applied; Baldwin had fair notice his conduct was prohibited.
Must mens rea be explicit; was there sufficient proof of knowledge?	Baldwin: regulations lack a mens rea and could impose strict liability.	Government: courts read a mens rea requirement (knowingly) into silent criminal provisions; evidence showed Baldwin heard and intentionally fled.	Held: Court read a knowing requirement into the regs; trial evidence supported knowing conduct.
Was failure to post required notice a defense or plain error?	Baldwin: statutory/regulatory posting requirement (40 U.S.C. §1315(c)(1)) was not proven; conviction invalid.	Government: Baldwin forfeited the posting challenge by not raising it at trial; posting may not be an element and trial court did not plainly err.	Held: Argument forfeited; no plain error shown; court declined to treat posting as a clearly required element.

Key Cases Cited

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (United States Supreme Court) (courts presume mens rea unless Congress clearly dispenses with it)
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (United States Supreme Court) (strict liability in criminal law is disfavored)
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (United States Supreme Court) (ambiguity in criminal statutes resolved in favor of mens rea and lenity)
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (United States Supreme Court) (vagueness inquiries focus on whether defendant had fair notice as to his conduct)
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (United States Supreme Court) (delegation to promulgate regulations with criminal sanctions raises interpretive questions)
United States v. Orona, 724 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (void-for-vagueness standard cited)
United States v. Franklin-El, 554 F.3d 903 (10th Cir.) (vagueness as-applied precedent)
United States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir.) (Assimilative Crimes Act principles)
Watson v. United States, 485 F.3d 1100 (10th Cir.) (standard for overturning trial court factual findings)
Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir.) (forfeiture and plain error standards)
United States v. Strakoff, 719 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir.) (treating posting as required element in predecessor statute)
United States v. Strong, 724 F.3d 51 (1st Cir.) (refusing to treat posting as prerequisite to prosecution)
United States v. Irby, [citation="269 F. App'x 246"] (4th Cir.) (similar refusal regarding posting requirement)
United States v. Brice, 926 F.2d 925 (9th Cir.) (reading mens rea into predecessor regulations)