United States v. Ausby
278 F. Supp. 3d 461
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- On December 14, 1971 Deborah Noel was raped and shot dead in her apartment; crime scene yielded scented oil vials, hairs of unknown origin, a single usable latent fingerprint, and bullet fragments.
- John Milton Ausby was arrested December 17, 1971 in New York with a .357 Magnum containing two spent cartridges like those at the scene and a small vial of oil similar to vials recovered at the apartment; vendor identified Ausby as purchaser of specific oils days earlier.
- At trial (1972) the government presented circumstantial and forensic evidence: the vendor’s identification and receipts, a fingerprint match to Ausby, firearms evidence linking Ausby’s gun to the murder profile, and FBI hair‑comparison testimony (Special Agent Neill) that many hairs were “microscopically identical” to Ausby.
- Ausby was convicted of felony murder and carnal knowledge while armed and sentenced to life plus concurrent terms; appeals were unsuccessful.
- Decades later DOJ/FBI review concluded that FBI microscopic hair comparison testimony was unreliable and contained false or misleading statements; the government conceded the hair testimony in Ausby’s trial was false and imputed knowledge of the falsity to the prosecution.
- Ausby filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion (2016) seeking vacatur on Napue/Giglio grounds; the district court denied relief, finding no reasonable likelihood the false hair testimony affected the verdict given the other overwhelming evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ausby) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the government’s knowing use of false FBI hair‑matching testimony violated due process (Napue/Giglio) | Neill’s hair testimony was powerful, framed as scientifically conclusive and crucial to identifying Ausby as the killer; therefore its falsity likely affected the verdict. | Government concedes the hair testimony was false/misleading but contends the remaining evidence (oil vials, fingerprint, firearms, witness observations) was overwhelming; no reasonable likelihood the false testimony changed outcome. | Denied; court found government’s knowing use satisfied the first two elements but hair testimony was not material — no reasonable likelihood it affected the verdict. |
| Standard for materiality in Napue/Giglio claims | (Implicit) Any reasonable possibility that false testimony could have affected the jury suffices. | Materiality requires showing any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected jury judgment; petitioner bears burden. | Court applied the established Napue/Giglio standard — petitioner must show any reasonable likelihood of effect; burden on petitioner. |
| Whether the hair testimony alone entitled Ausby to relief | Hair evidence was decisive and, standing alone, would have been enough to convict. | Even without hair testimony, cumulative non‑hair evidence overwhelmingly proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. | Rejected; hair testimony not outcome‑determinative given strong cumulative evidence. |
| Allocation of burden on materiality and harmless‑error | Petitioner argued burden placement is irrelevant or should favor defendant. | Precedent places burden on petitioner to show materiality/prejudice; prosecution need not disprove Napue/Giglio by default. | Court followed Circuit and Supreme Court precedent: petitioner bears burden to prove materiality by preponderance in §2255 collateral attack. |
Key Cases Cited
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (knowing use of false testimony violates due process; conviction must be set aside if false testimony could reasonably have affected jury)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (prosecution’s failure to correct or disclose false testimony requires new trial if it could have affected jury)
- Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (conviction obtained by deliberate deception of court/jury inconsistent with due process)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of evidence favorable to accused violates due process when material)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady materiality framework; three‑part test and prejudice requirement)
- United States v. Vega, 826 F.3d 514 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (evaluate false testimony in context of the whole record; materiality requires reasonable likelihood of affecting verdict)
- Agurs v. United States, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (Brady applies to cases where prosecution’s case includes perjured testimony known or should have been known by prosecution)
- Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (context on §2255 and habeas framework)
- Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002 (2016) (clarifies Napue/Giglio materiality — need not show more‑likely‑than‑not acquittal; must undermine confidence in verdict)