United States v. Aundre Davis
924 F.3d 899
6th Cir.2019Background
- In January 2016, Aundre Davis helped arrange and participate in prostitution of a 16‑year‑old (S.S.) over three distinct days; S.S. also had a history of prior prostitution and drug use.
- Davis was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to sex‑traffic a minor, two counts of transporting a minor for prostitution, and three counts of sex trafficking a minor.
- At sentencing, Probation calculated an adjusted offense level of 41 (life range); the Government argued the three trafficking events should be grouped separately (three groups) and sought a two‑level obstruction enhancement, later withdrawn.
- The district court adopted three groups (one per day) and applied a two‑level ‘‘undue‑influence’’ enhancement based largely on a rebuttable presumption because Davis was over ten years older than S.S.; the court made limited factual findings on influence.
- The court initially orally pronounced life imprisonment, then (before entry of judgment) held a supplemental hearing and imposed 360 months. Davis appealed only the procedural reasonableness of his sentence; the Government cross‑appealed the court’s reconsideration of the oral sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Davis) | Defendant's Argument (Govt.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the three trafficking counts should be grouped into one group or three under USSG §3D1.2 | Counts were part of one short course of conduct, single victim and objective; should be one group | Events were separate harms on different days; should be grouped separately | Affirmed: counts are separate groups (one per day) because each day was a distinct instance of harm |
| Whether the two‑level undue‑influence enhancement under USSG §2G1.3(b)(2)(B) was supported | The rebuttable presumption was rebutted: S.S. previously prostituted, solicited clients, and sometimes refused Davis’ clients | Presumption stands; Davis failed to rebut undue influence | Vacated sentence and remanded: district court failed to make required factual findings and closely consider record evidence before applying enhancement |
| Whether the district court could change the orally pronounced sentence before entry of written judgment | Court could revisit sentence because judgment not entered | Oral pronouncement final; court lacked authority to change sentence once pronounced | Moot on appeal (remand for resentencing); court inclined to agree oral sentence is final but did not decide due to remand |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Bivens, 811 F.3d 840 (6th Cir.) (distinct crimes across different times may be separate groups)
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (Guidelines commentary is authoritative absent conflict)
- United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229 (6th Cir.) (discussion of undue‑influence presumption where age gap exists)
- United States v. Angel, 576 F.3d 318 (6th Cir.) (standard of review for sentencing calculations)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (procedural‑reasonableness requirement that court explain chosen sentence)
- United States v. Straughter, 950 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir.) (district court best situated to resolve sentencing factual conflicts)
- United States v. Garcia‑Robles, 640 F.3d 159 (6th Cir.) (plenary resentencing on remand)
- United States v. Arroyo, 434 F.3d 835 (6th Cir.) (implying sentence imposed at oral pronouncement)
- United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743 (6th Cir.) (similarholding on finality of oral sentence)