United States v. Atrel Howard, Jr., 947 F.3d 936

On Nov. 12, 2017 a caller identifying himself as Atrel Howard left a 1:54 voicemail for former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder saying, among other things, “I’m going to kill you. I am going to murder you,” and referencing perceived injustices against him.
Covington & Burling’s voicemail logs and call records tied the call to a Cleveland number associated with Howard’s father; Secret Service and Howard’s probation officer identified Howard’s voice.
Howard was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for knowingly and willfully transmitting a communication containing a threat; no objection to the indictment or jury instructions was made at trial.
At trial the parties jointly proposed jury instructions; the district court instructed jurors that the government must prove transmission in interstate commerce, that the defendant transmitted the communication either with purpose to issue a threat or with knowledge it would be understood as a threat, and that a reasonable person would view the communication as a threat.
The jury convicted Howard; he was sentenced to 30 months (plus concurrent term for supervised-release violation) and appealed raising three challenges: indictment sufficiency post-Elonis, the “true threat” jury instruction, and sufficiency of evidence.

Issue	Howard's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the indictment omitted the required mens rea after Elonis	Indictment was defective because it did not allege Howard intended the voicemail to be a threat or knew it would be so viewed	Indictment’s language ("knowingly and willfully" plus factual detail) sufficiently alleges mens rea when liberally construed	Affirmed — indictment sufficient under liberal construction; no plain error
Whether the jury instruction permitted a negligence standard for “true threat”	Instruction’s reference to a “reasonable person” allowed a negligence-based standard contrary to Elonis	Instruction properly required subjective intent (purpose or knowledge) per Elonis and used reasonable-person test only for the objective threat element	Affirmed — instruction complied with Elonis; not plain error (also invited-error considerations)
Whether evidence was sufficient to prove an objective “true threat” and defendant’s intent	Voicemail was ambiguous and nonsensical; Howard lacked motive and connection to Holder, so government did not prove subjective intent or objective threat	The explicit “I’m going to kill you” language, context, multiple calls, voice identifications, and jury instruction supported conviction	Affirmed — a rational jury could find both objective threat and subjective intent beyond a reasonable doubt

Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015) (§ 875(c) requires proof defendant transmitted the communication for purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge it would be viewed as a threat)
United States v. Doggart, 906 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2018) (articulates § 875(c) elements: interstate communication, reasonable-observer threat, and defendant’s intent)
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (indictment must contain elements and provide fair notice)
United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667 (6th Cir. 2008) (courts liberally construe indictments in favor of sufficiency)
United States v. Martinez, 800 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2015) (similar § 875(c) indictment found insufficient post-Elonis)
United States v. Khan, 937 F.3d 1042 (7th Cir. 2019) (indictment quoting explicit threats held sufficient to imply requisite mens rea)
United States v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1978) (indictment must allege the specific intent element where statute requires it)
United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2012) (pre-Elonis discussion of true-threat analysis)