United States v. Ashford
718 F.3d 377
| 4th Cir. | 2013Background
- Ashford, a convicted felon, retrieved a .38 revolver after an earlier quarrel and, while pursuing Marcus Chaplin, said “I should kill you” and fired three shots, wounding Chaplin and later firing at a third person; police later arrested Ashford and seized the firearm.
- Ashford pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)).
- The PSR applied a Guidelines cross reference under USSG § 2K2.1(c) to attempted murder, yielding a Guidelines range near the statutory maximum; the district court adopted the PSR but treated the substituted offense as attempted second-degree murder, resulting in a 120-month sentence.
- On appeal Ashford raised two arguments: (1) a cross reference to attempted murder was improper because attempted murder is a non-groupable offense excluded from USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2); and (2) the PSR’s facts did not establish the malice required for attempted second-degree murder (arguing instead for attempted voluntary manslaughter).
- The Fourth Circuit reviewed the waiver argument (raised late by the government) and exercised discretion to consider Ashford’s first claim de novo; it then addressed both the legal question of Relevant Conduct interpretation and the factual sufficiency for malice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ashford) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a non-groupable offense (attempted murder) can serve as "relevant conduct" for a Guidelines cross reference | § 1B1.3(a)(2) excludes non-groupable offenses from being relevant conduct, so attempted murder cannot be the basis for a cross reference | § 1B1.3(a)(1) and (a)(2) are separate; a non-groupable offense can qualify under (a)(1) if it occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction | Court held (a)(1) and (a)(2) are alternative/sufficient paths; non-groupable offenses may qualify under (a)(1) and cross reference was proper |
| Whether the PSR established the mental state (malice) required for attempted second-degree murder | The facts support at most attempted voluntary manslaughter, not malice aforethought required for second-degree murder | The defendant’s conduct (retrieving gun, threats, pursuit, and shooting while not provoked or enraged) permits an inference of malice/wanton recklessness | Court held district court did not clearly err; facts support attempted second-degree murder and the cross reference upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Horton, 693 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2012) (discusses grouping exclusion and relevant conduct analysis)
- United States v. Johnson, 347 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2003) (explains (a)(2) allows broader conduct than (a)(1))
- United States v. McCants, 434 F.3d 557 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (supports disjunctive reading of Relevant Conduct subsections)
- United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2003) (defines malice as wanton and reckless conduct showing awareness of serious risk)
- United States v. Pauley, 289 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2002) (cross-reference requires relevant conduct under § 1B1.3)
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (Sentencing Guideline commentary is authoritative unless inconsistent with the statute)