United States v. Arthur, 764 F.3d 92

On Oct. 31, 2011 two armed men robbed a MetroPCS store in Boston; a 911/radio dispatch gave a generic description (two Black men, armed, dark heavy clothing) and their direction of flight.
Within minutes, Officer Golden, on patrol about an eighth of a mile away, was told by a resident that two Black men had been seen running; he then encountered Arthur and Brown walking away from the area and stopped them.
The officer approached in a marked cruiser with lights on, placed a hand on his holster, ordered the men to show hands, and detained them for questioning; the officer later received corroborating information and brought the men back to the store.
The store clerk, who had been bound during the robbery and initially provided a description, performed a show-up identification of Brown and then Arthur (the clerk immediately and confidently identified Arthur).
Arthur moved to suppress the stop and the identification; the district court denied suppression (finding reasonable suspicion for the stop and that, although suggestive, the show-up identification was sufficiently reliable).
Arthur entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the suppression issues and appealed; the First Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Officer Golden had reasonable suspicion to stop Arthur	Arthur: stop was unjustified because description was generic and facts (walking vs running, street location, clothing) did not sufficiently corroborate involvement	Government/Officer: description + immediate timing, close proximity, correct number/race, corroborating witness (leaf-raker), direction of travel, and lack of other pedestrians gave reasonable suspicion	Court: Stop was justified — totality of circumstances produced reasonable, articulable suspicion
Whether the show-up identification should be suppressed as a due-process violation	Arthur: show-up was impermissibly suggestive and the clerk’s stress, lack of glasses, and suggestiveness produced substantial risk of misidentification	Government: despite suggestiveness, Biggers factors (opportunity, attention, accurate prior description, prompt ID, witness certainty) supported reliability so evidence should be admitted	Court: Even assuming the procedure was suggestive, the totality of circumstances (including several Biggers factors) made the ID reliable; admission did not violate due process

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (establishes standard for investigatory stops)
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (reasonable suspicion evaluated under the totality of circumstances)
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (factors for evaluating reliability of eyewitness ID)
United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63 (appellate review standard for suppression rulings)
United States v. Lee, 317 F.3d 26 (upholding suppression denials supported by reasonable views of the record)
United States v. Carrigan, 724 F.3d 39 (discusses limits of relying on generic descriptions, noted as distinguishable)
United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718 (example where reasonable suspicion was lacking when description and corroboration were inadequate)
United States v. Pontoo, 666 F.3d 20 (supports inference from being the only person present matching description near crime scene)
United States v. Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d 277 (describes due-process exclusion only in extraordinary misidentification risk)
United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92 (discusses application of Biggers factors)