United States v. Arias
848 F.3d 504
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- Federal investigation into Jason Melchionda’s heroin-distribution network led to wiretaps and surveillance identifying a supplier called "Sarnie."
- A Nissan Murano (titled to Luis Rodriguez) was surveilled during suspected transactions; Detective Gecoya's GPS-warrant affidavit incorrectly identified Rodriguez as "Sarnie."
- Senny Arias was later identified driving the Murano, stopped twice (July 24 and August 6, 2013), and arrested on August 15, 2013; police recovered heroin on his person and in his apartment.
- Arias was indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin (21 U.S.C. § 846) and possession with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)); convicted by a jury in May 2015 and sentenced to 66 months (district court attributed 400–700 grams of heroin to him).
- Arias appealed, challenging pretrial rulings (denial of Franks hearing, suppression of two traffic stops, denial of leave to file a late suppression motion, denial of continuance), several trial rulings (admission of a co-conspirator statement; denial of mistrial after exposure to phone-number evidence), and the drug-quantity finding at sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Arias) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denial of Franks hearing on GPS-warrant affidavit | Affidavit mistakes were not reckless or intentional; no Franks hearing required | Gecoya knowingly or recklessly misidentified Rodriguez as "Sarnie," and that falsehood was necessary to probable cause | Affirmed: Arias failed to make the substantial preliminary showing of reckless or intentional falsity; no Franks hearing required |
| Suppression of evidence from two traffic stops | Stops lawful because detectives had reasonable suspicion imputable to arresting officers based on surveillance, ID, and intercepted communications | Stops lacked reasonable suspicion specific to Arias | Affirmed: sufficient particularized facts gave Gecoya reasonable suspicion that Arias (and the Murano) were involved in drug activity |
| Denial of leave to file untimely motion to suppress wiretap | Denial proper because motion was untimely and Arias did not demonstrate prejudice or explain grounds | Late filing justified by new information and need for preparation; prejudice from denial | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion; no showing of prejudice or stated grounds for the untimely motion |
| Denial of continuance shortly before trial | Government argued trial date reasonable; curative measures adequate when issues arose | Counsel needed more time to investigate wiretap, prepare suppression, and prevent prejudicial testimony | Affirmed: no abuse of discretion—Arias failed to show specific substantial prejudice from denial |
| Admission of recorded statement as co-conspirator hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) | Statement by Melchionda about receiving heroin from Arias was in furtherance of the conspiracy | Statement was idle or social conversation, not in furtherance | Affirmed: court reasonably found statement advanced the conspiracy’s business and was admissible |
| Denial of mistrial after jury exposed to phone-number evidence | Curative instruction and timely judicial response cured prejudice | Exposure linked Arias to intercepted calls; mistrial required | Affirmed: court excluded exhibits, instructed jury to disregard, and Arias failed to rebut presumption jurors followed instruction |
| Drug-quantity attribution at sentencing (400–700 g) | Quantity findings based on seized heroin, surveillance, intercepted calls, conservative extrapolations | Quantity overstated; should be limited to recorded transactions and contested apartment evidence | Affirmed: district court’s approximations were reasoned and not clearly erroneous; total attributable heroin exceeded 400 g |
Key Cases Cited
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (warrant-affidavit falsity standard for Franks hearing)
- United States v. Tanguay, 787 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2015) (Franks preliminary-showing standard)
- United States v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2007) (reasonable suspicion may be imputed to executing officer)
- United States v. Arnott, 758 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2014) (surveillance plus intercepted communications can supply reasonable suspicion for stops)
- United States v. Paz-Alvarez, 799 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2015) (standard for admitting co-conspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E))
- United States v. Pagán-Ferrer, 736 F.3d 573 (1st Cir. 2013) (mistrial review factors; curative instruction presumption)
- United States v. Mullins, 778 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2015) (clear-error review of drug-quantity factual findings)