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787 F.3d 131
2d Cir.
2015
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Background

  • Apple was found liable under Sherman Act §1 after a bench trial for conspiring with five major publishers to raise e-book prices and for Apple's role in facilitating that conspiracy.
  • An omnibus injunction entered September 5, 2013 required Apple to adopt compliance policies/training and to appoint an external monitor under Rule 53 to review Apple’s compliance with the injunction.
  • The injunction granted the DOJ and states control over monitor selection; Apple could object to the plaintiffs’ recommendations but could not unilaterally nominate a monitor.
  • Michael Bromwich was appointed as external monitor on October 16, 2013 after the plaintiffs recommended him.
  • Bromwich began inquiries within days of appointment, including interviews of Apple directors, which Apple opposed as premature and improperly scope-limited by the 90-day period to formulate policies.
  • Disputes intensified over Bromwich’s communications with Apple officers/directors and over his proposed hourly fees; Apple objected to the process and the rates, while the district court noted the monitor’s compensation would be on reasonable and customary terms.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Disqualification of the monitor Apple argues Bromwich’s ex parte communications show bias and require disqualification. Bromwich did not demonstrate bias; record shows limited ex parte activity, not disqualifying. No abuse of discretion in denying disqualification.
Implicit modification of the injunction Apple contends Bromwich’s conduct and district court acquiescence expanded the injunction beyond its terms. The injunction was not substantially modified; any changes remain within limits set by the court and further constrained by law. Injunction not substantially modified; later interpretation imposes sharp limits on monitor’s power.
Limitations on monitor conduct and dispute-resolution Apple objects to ex parte communications and to the monitor exceeding the monitoring scope. Monitor actions are bounded by the injunction and applicable law; dispute-resolution procedures exist and were available. Monitor remains constrained by injunction and law; Apple’s objections should be resolved via district court processes.

Key Cases Cited

  • EEOC v. Local 40, Int'l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 76 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1996) (modification standards for injunctions and agency actions)
  • Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (appearance of partiality and impropriety concerns)
  • Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981) (structural considerations in modification of injunctions)
  • Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981) (standards for injunctive relief and remedies)
  • Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1991) (post-judgment remedial review jurisdiction)
  • In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950 (2d Cir. 2008) (abuse of discretion standard in disqualification rulings)
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Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Apple Inc. Texas v. Apple Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date Published: May 28, 2015
Citations: 787 F.3d 131; 2015 WL 3405534; 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 8854; 91 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1562; Docket 14-60, 14-61
Docket Number: Docket 14-60, 14-61
Court Abbreviation: 2d Cir.
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