United States v. Antwain Price
777 F.3d 700
| 4th Cir. | 2015Background
- Price was charged in May 2012 in the District of South Carolina with knowingly failing to register as a sex offender under SORNA §2250(a) based on a prior ABHAN conviction.
- Price’s prior offense was a common-law ABHAN conviction in York County, SC (July 2010), involving unlawful violent injury with aggravating circumstances.
- The indictment alleged Price’s ABHAN conviction was a sex offense under SORNA; Price moved to dismiss on that basis and the district court denied the motion in August 2012 (Denial Order).
- Price pleaded guilty to §2250(a) on August 27, 2012; he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and a life term of supervised release based on treating ABHAN as a sex offense under §5D1.2(b)(2).
- On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly used the circumstance-specific approach to determine whether ABHAN fell within SORNA’s sex-offense definition, but erred in treating the ABHAN conviction as a sex offense for Guidelines purposes; the case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing.
- The court’s decision relied on the premise that ABHAN is indivisible and that the correct framework for §16911(7) is the circumstance-specific (noncategorical) approach, while subsequent Guidelines issues were sent back for resentencing consistent with this ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicable analytical framework for §16911(7) | Price argues for a categorical/mod ified-categorical approach. | United States supports the circumstance-specific approach as proper for §16911(7). | Circumstance-specific approach applies. |
| Whether ABHAN qualifies as a sex offense under §2250(a) when applied via SORNA | Price contends ABHAN is not a sex offense under SORNA. | The government contends ABHAN satisfies the sex-offense definition under SORNA. | Yes, ABHAN can be a sex offense under SORNA when analyzed circumstantially. |
| Guidelines calculation for supervised release | Price argues 5D1.2(b)(2) improperly increases the upper limit to life. | The government relies on the extended interpretation under the guidelines. | Plain error; remand for resentencing per Collins. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (elements framework for categoric/modified approaches)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limits of modified categorical approach; focus on elements)
- Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (circumstance-specific analysis when statute refers to specific conduct)
- Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc: noncategorical approach appropriate for §16911(7))
- Byun, 539 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (noncategorical approach applied to age/specified offenses)
- Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 2013) (ABHAN indivisible; supports noncategorical analysis)