United States v. Antone White
984 F.3d 76
| D.C. Cir. | 2020Background
- Antone White and Eric Hicks were convicted in 1994 of drug and related offenses (including §841 conspiracies and RICO); they received life and long concurrent terms.
- The Fair Sentencing Act (2010) raised crack-cocaine quantity thresholds; the First Step Act §404 (2018) authorized retroactive sentence reductions for certain "covered offense[s]."
- In 2019 White and Hicks moved under §404 for reduced sentences; the district court found their offenses “covered” but concluded relief was largely "unavailable" (using a defendant-specific quantity test) and denied relief except as to one count.
- The Government later conceded on appeal that the convictions were covered and that relief cannot be categorically barred by the actual drug quantity.
- The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, holding the district court misread §404(b), failed to show it considered §3553(a) factors and post‑sentencing mitigation, and may have relied on erroneous factual findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of "covered offense" under §404(a) | Conviction qualifies if statute of conviction had penalties modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, regardless of actual drug quantity | Relief should depend on the defendant-specific drug quantity that would change statutory exposure | Covered offense is determined categorically by the statute of conviction; actual quantity irrelevant to §404(a) eligibility |
| Whether §404(b) requires an "availability" test based on judge/jury-found drug quantities | §404(b) does not add an availability requirement; courts may grant relief for any covered offense (if §404(c) limits don't apply) | District court: relief "available" only if Fair Sentencing Act would have changed defendant-specific statutory range | §404(b) contains no such availability test; district courts may not make relief categorically unavailable because of specific quantities |
| Considerations and procedural obligations when exercising discretion under §404(b) | District courts must consider §3553(a) factors, post‑sentencing conduct, and statutory remedial purpose and provide an adequate explanation | Government: district court has broad discretion to deny relief (but later conceded some points) | Courts must consider §3553(a), post-sentencing rehabilitation, and First Step Act remedial purpose; sentencing denials must be procedurally reasonable and adequately explained |
| Use of judge-found vs jury-found quantities and reliance on facts | Both judge- and jury-found quantities can be considered as part of discretion; courts must not rely on clearly erroneous facts | District court relied on judge-found quantities and possibly an erroneous factual account of Hicks's obstruction enhancement | Both judge- and jury-found quantities are permissible considerations, but reliance on clearly erroneous facts is an abuse of discretion; remand required to correct record and reasoning |
Key Cases Cited
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (describing crack/powder sentencing disparity and Fair Sentencing Act context)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard for appellate review of sentencing)
- Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (look to remedial statute purpose to constrain discretionary relief)
- United States v. Hudson, 967 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2020) (district court may consider broad range of factors including post‑sentencing conduct under First Step Act)
- United States v. Jackson, 964 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2020) (rejecting eligibility rules that require speculative reconstruction of pre‑Fair Sentencing Act proceedings)
- United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 2020) (First Step Act is remedial and intended to address racial sentencing disparities)
- United States v. Shaw, 957 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2020) (remand required where district court failed to address post‑sentencing rehabilitation and provided inadequate explanation)
- United States v. Ware, 964 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2020) (both judge‑ and jury‑found drug quantities may be considered when exercising discretion under §404)