United States v. Anthony Wayne Morrison Lazzara
709 F. App'x 578
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Lazzara was indicted for making a false statement on a U.S. passport application and for perjury; prosecution was delayed roughly 15 years before arrest and indictment were effectuated.
- During the intervening years Lazzara used multiple aliases (e.g., Gregory Gibson, William Jay Woolston) to evade law enforcement in a separate matter.
- Lazzara was unaware of the indictment/warrant until his 2015 arrest; the Government located and investigated possible alias leads (found the true Gibson, learned Woolston was deceased) but did not link those aliases to Lazzara until after his arrest.
- Lazzara moved to dismiss the indictment under the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right; the district court denied the motion, finding Lazzara’s use of aliases was the primary cause of the delay and the Government acted at most negligently.
- On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the mixed question (legal de novo, facts for clear error) and affirmed the district court, applying the four Barker factors.
Issues
| Issue | Lazzara's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ~15-year delay violated the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right | Delay was presumptively prejudicial and should lead to dismissal | Delay mainly resulted from Lazzara’s alias use; government acted reasonably; any negligence was not dispositive | Affirmed denial of dismissal; Barker factors do not compel relief |
| Who bears blame for the delay (Barker factor 2) | Government’s investigation was negligent and responsible for delay | Lazzara’s deliberate use of aliases to evade detection was the primary cause | Court found Lazzara culpable for delay; second factor weighed against him |
| Effect of Lazzara’s assertion or waiver of speedy-trial right (Barker factor 3) | Timely asserted right after arrest; supports prejudice inference | Lazzara later signed a written waiver and sought continuances, undermining weight of assertion | Court treated assertion as timely but noted waiver/continuances reduce its weight |
| Actual prejudice from delay (Barker factor 4) | Lengthy delay caused anxiety and impaired ability to defend (claimed inability to plead to this indictment earlier) | No particularized prejudice shown; government rebutted presumption by showing aliases caused delay | Lazzara failed to prove actual prejudice; fourth factor did not require relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (establishes four-factor speedy-trial test)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (long post-indictment delay caused by government negligence can obviate need for particularized prejudice)
- United States v. Villarreal, 613 F.3d 1344 (standard of review and application of Barker in Eleventh Circuit)
- United States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332 (defendant not culpable for delay when unaware of indictment and had no reason to believe he was being pursued)
- United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285 (one-year delay is presumptively prejudicial and triggers Barker analysis)
- United States v. Clark, 83 F.3d 1350 (in negligence cases burden to show prejudice decreases as delay lengthens)