United States v. Anthony Taylor
800 F.3d 701
| 6th Cir. | 2015Background
- Anthony Taylor was convicted by a jury of possession of a stolen firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(j)) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); he received a 262‑month sentence under the ACCA enhancement.
- Undercover informant Bridget Hayden arranged to buy firearms from Taylor, who produced a disassembled shotgun retrieved from Lee "Clyde" Smith’s home; police arrested Taylor in Hayden’s car with the shotgun on the floorboard next to his seat.
- Smith testified the shotgun was his, that Taylor did not have permission to take it, and that Taylor gave him $30 (a repayment of a debt) when visiting the house; Taylor did not testify.
- At trial the district court instructed the jury on both actual and constructive possession over the defense’s objection; defense moved for acquittal on the § 922(j) count arguing lack of knowledge the gun was stolen—motion denied.
- At sentencing the PSR classified Taylor as an armed career criminal based on four prior violent felonies; defense argued for a downward variance partly on the ground that Taylor’s advanced age at release would reduce recidivism risk, but the court imposed the low end of the Guidelines (262 months).
- Taylor also sought to hold his appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson (ACCA residual‑clause challenge); after Johnson the Sixth Circuit concluded Johnson did not affect Taylor’s ACCA enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Taylor) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether giving a constructive‑possession jury instruction was erroneous | Instruction was appropriate because the shotgun was not on Taylor’s physical person when found | Only actual possession was supported by evidence; constructive instruction was legally unwarranted | Court: Instruction was erroneous but harmless as a matter of law; conviction affirmed |
| 2) Sufficiency of evidence for § 922(j) (possession of a stolen firearm) | Smith’s testimony that the shotgun was his, missing from his home, and taken by Taylor supported conviction | Taylor claimed he brokered a sale; evidence insufficient to show knowledge the gun was stolen | Court: Evidence was sufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the government; conviction stands |
| 3) Procedural reasonableness of sentence—failure to explicitly address age/recidivism argument | Court sufficiently considered § 3553(a) factors and personal characteristics and gave a reasoned explanation | Failure to explicitly address age‑recidivism argument warrants reversal or remand | Court: Plain‑error review applies; objection not raised with requisite specificity; no plain error—sentence procedural reasonable |
| 4) Effect of Johnson (ACCA residual‑clause invalidation) on Taylor’s ACCA enhancement | ACCA enhancement remains if other predicate convictions qualify under non‑residual clauses | Johnson might eliminate predicate status for some prior convictions that relied on the residual clause | Court: Johnson does not affect Taylor’s ACCA enhancement because his prior convictions qualify under the enumerated or use‑of‑force clauses; enhancement stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991) (an unsupported theory in jury instructions is harmless when another supported theory remains)
- Mari v. United States, 47 F.3d 782 (6th Cir. 1995) (harmless‑error analysis when jury receives an unsupported theory)
- James v. United States, 819 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1987) (reversal for giving constructive‑possession instruction unsupported by record)
- Gardner v. United States, 488 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2007) (definition of actual vs. constructive possession)
- Mitchell v. United States, 743 F.3d 1054 (6th Cir.) (Tennessee robbery qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA independent of residual clause)
- Caruthers v. United States, 458 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2006) (pre‑1989 Tennessee third‑degree burglary can qualify as generic burglary under ACCA)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause is unconstitutionally vague)
